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Analysis
Making the Joint Terrorism
Mechanism Work
by Col. Rahul K. Bhonsle
Indo Pakistan
relations are forever mired in the mutual suspicion of policy makers, cynicism
of analysts and antipathy of intelligence operatives. This was more than evident
during the debate that ensued following the Havana Declaration establishing an
Indo Pakistan Joint Counter Terrorism Mechanism. What irked many was equating
terrorism in Pakistan with that in India, which appears to have been a tactical
palliative to assuage Islamabad. The roots of terrorism in Pakistan are in
tribalism and communal sectarianism unlike in India where perceived grievances
have been fanned by support particularly monetary from across the border. A
check on the flow of money to many militant protagonists in Srinagar, would see
drying up of political underpinnings of the Kashmiri agitation.
The Indian Prime Minister and the Pakistani President have over the past few
months been talking of imparting creativity to the bureaucratic stasis in which
the Indo Pakistan dialogue process had fallen lately. Thus an out of the box
solution was more than expected. Proving the critiques wrong however will be
least of the problems that now faces the establishments on both sides as they
grapple with the reality of making the seeming grandstanding in Havana work.
Given the trajectory of Indo Pakistan relations post Operation Parakram, however
there is much reason for hope. Softer borders, assertions in a Lahore court that
Hafeez Saeed, the Lashkar chief was putting relations with a neighboring country
in a jeopardy, possibilities of intra country banking if not implementation of
SAFTA are all indications of the willingness of both sides for a glasnost if not
a perestroika.
The Joint Terrorism Mechanism can act as a catalyst for such a restructuring by
veering away Pakistan from its strategy of deniability of terror. A major gain
achieved by India so far has been to focus the discussion on Terrorism rather
than on Kashmir. To convert polemics into pragmatic policies, procedures and
mechanisms needs a vast shift in attitudes. The luxury of Commissioners of
police raising a finger at Islamabad would have to be given up for a more
credible presentation of proof without causing public embarrassment to the
establishment across the border, thereby bringing more civility in the
relationship as well.
Setting up an organization for interaction and communication channels would be
one of the first issues needing resolution. In the case of a dispute on the
borders the hot line between the director generals of military operations acts
as a very valuable link for exchange of information between armies on both
sides. Unlike the Armed Forces, there is no central headquarters of the police
which can coordinate the joint terror dialogue. The diffused nature of turfs
between the Ministry of Home and External Affairs will also pose a problem. The
DGMO hot line is one option which may work, given that the Army controls the
uniformed forces in Pakistan, but the same may not be true in Delhi.
Intelligence sharing rather than investigations should be next in priority.
Inter agency rivalry between external and internal intelligence organizations
needs to be exploited for this purpose, which will overcome apprehensions of
both sides about ISI and RAW. Pakistan’s growing interests of controlling hydra
headed monsters as the Jamaat ud Dawa which after the Earthquake in Kashmir last
year is seen to assume the mantle of Hezbollah in Lebanon needs to be played up
to undermine its support to these organizations. Open discussions at the
political and police level will have an impact as the Afghan example is
denoting, where the NATO commander has not hesitated in discussing the role of
ISI directly with Islamabad.
Periodic review of cases is important and the mechanism would have to address
the issue of frequency. Selection of personnel to man the joint organization
will be crucial to its success. The wet blankets and paranoids are best left to
man the rear guard and exceptional officers with adroit skills in negotiations
and a positive belief in the peace process can take forward the vision spelt out
in Havana. For India, the bottom line remains reining in of the ISI, which will
have spin offs for Pakistan as well, for despite having a comparatively low 17
percent population below the poverty line, it faces the ignominy of being
amongst the first ten possible failed states in the World, an ill deserved
penalty, but an unintended consequence of its hyper active intelligence arm.
October 22, 2006
Top | Analysis
The Week of October 22, 2006
The Cover-up of HDW, Airbus Scams by Rajinder
Puri
The Main Contenders: Presidential Elections in
India by Dr. Subhash Kapila
Bush Whacked by Gaurang Bhatt, MD
Making the Joint Terrorism Mechanism Work by
Col. Rahul K. Bhonsle
A Menacing Neo-Jinnah (Quaid-e-Azam) in U
P by V. Sundaram
Hydroelectric Projects in the Shadow of
Avalanches by VK Joshi
Changing Scenarios ... Women's Lib to Men's Lib
by Naira Yaqoob
Professor K. Swaminathan : A Himalayan Professor
and Savant by V. Sundram
Runa Banerji: The Woman Behind SEWA by Rajsaran
Varma
Making Menopause Easier by Neeta Lal
Beating About the Breast by Elayne Clift
Circumcise and Live by Crespo Sebunya
Use TV as a Channel for Peace by Noa Cohen
The Other Cola War by Nilanjana Biswas
A Safe Place for Men by Nitin Jugran Bahuguna
Reclaiming Streets for Women by Anuja
Mirchandaney
Tryst with Nehru by VK Joshi
The Law by Kumud Biswas
The Remix Revolution by Ramendra Kumar
Surabhi Ke Sunehre Pal by Yamini Ayyagari
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