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Analysis
Abject surrender?
A tale of Subversive
Anti-nationalism - II
by V. Sundaram
The political
ferment, socio-economic and cultural confusion in the North-eastern region of
India as a whole in the ominous context of abrupt occupation of Tibet by China
in October 1950 and their immediate and future implications for national
security were all clearly understood and foreseen by Sardar Vallabai Patel with
clairvoyant vision just five weeks before his death when he wrote to Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru on 7 November, 1950 :
'Let us also
consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier.
Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim,
Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam. From the point of view of
communication, there are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not
exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police
protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There, too, our
outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us
is by no means close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have
no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong
areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three
years, we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas
and other hill tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had
been in touch with them, but their influence was in no way friendly to India
or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is
quite possible that discontent is smoldering there. Bhutan is comparatively
quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak
oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force: it is in conflict with a
turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the
modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger
or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that
difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a
clear line of policy. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration,
Soviet Union, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots,
partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their
ambitions.
In my judgement
the situation is one which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to
vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also
of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of
decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policies to
attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which
are so evident.
'Side by side
with these external dangers, we shall now have to face serious internal
problems as well. I have already asked H V R Iyengar to send to the External
Affairs Ministry a copy of the Intelligence Bureau's appreciation of these
matters. Hitherto, the Communist Party of India had found some difficulty in
contacting communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature,
etc., from them. They had to contend with the difficult Burmese and Pakistan
frontiers on the east or with the long seaboard. They shall now have a
comparatively easy means of access to Chinese communists and through them to
other foreign communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and
communists would now be easier. Instead of having to deal with isolated
communist pockets in Telengana and Warrangal we may have to deal with
communist threats to our security along our northern and north-eastern
frontiers, where, for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely
depend on communist arsenals in China. The whole situation thus raises a
number of problems on which we must come to an early decision so that we
can, as I said earlier, formulate the objectives of our policy and decide
the method by which those objectives are to be attained. It is also clear
that the action will have to be fairly comprehensive, involving not only our
defence strategy and state of preparations but also problem of internal
security to deal with which we have not a moment to lose. We shall also have
to deal with administrative and political problems in the weak spots along
the frontier to which I have already referred.
It is of course,
impossible to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am,
however, giving below some of the problems which, in my opinion, require
early solution and round which we have to build our administrative or
military policies and measures to implement them.
-
A military
and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the
frontier and to internal security.
-
An
examination of military position and such re-disposition of our forces
as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding important
routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.
-
An
appraisement of the strength of our forces and, if necessary,
reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of
the new threat.
-
A long-term
consideration of our defence needs. My own feeling is that, unless we
assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armor, we would be making
our defence perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to the
double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-west and
north and north-east.
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The question
of China's entry into the UN. In view of the rebuff which China has
given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet, I
am doubtful whether we can advocate its claim any longer. There would
probably be a threat in the UN virtually to outlaw China, in view of its
active participation in the Korean war. We must determine our attitude
on this question also.
-
The political
and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our northern
and north-eastern frontier. This would include the whole of the border,
i.e. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal territory in
Assam.
-
Measures of
internal security in the border areas as well as the states flanking
those areas such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal and Assam.
-
Improvement
of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless, in these areas and
with the frontier outposts.
-
The future of
our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyangtse and Yatung and the
forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade routes.
-
The policy in
regard to the McMahon Line.
These are some of
the questions which occur to my mind. It is possible that a consideration of
these matters may lead us into wider question of our relationship with
China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma. This, however, would be of a
general nature, though some might be basically very important, e.g., we
might have to consider whether we should not enter into closer association
with Burma in order to strengthen the latter in its dealings with China. I
do not rule out the possibility that, before applying pressure on us, China
might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely
undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial. In its
present position, Burma might offer an easier problem to China, and
therefore, might claim its first attention.
I suggest that we
meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such
steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct, quick
examination of other problems with a view to taking early measures to deal
with them'.
What was the
considered response of Jawaharlal Nehru to this letter from Sardar Patel?
Trapped in the deluded hallucination of triple synchronization – conceptual
confusion, technical incompetence and transcendental human failure – Nehru wrote
back to Sardar Patel on 18 November, 1950:
'We cannot save
Tibet, as we should have liked to do, and our very attempt to save it might
well bring greater trouble to it. It would be unfair to Tibet for us to
bring this trouble upon her without having the capacity to help her
effectively. It may be possible, however, that we might be able to help
Tibet to retain a large measure of her autonomy.'
Perhaps, Montaigne
had political 'buffoons' like Nehru in view when he wrote with biting sarcasm: 'No
man is exempt from talking nonsense. The misfortune is to do it solemnly.'
Solemn and secular nonsense often dished out with supreme love for himself and
unconcealed contempt for others, based on his love for Russia and China, became
the warp and woof of his socio-economic policy after independence.
Sardar Vallabai Patel
passed away on 15, December 1950. With a sense of great political relief,
Jawaharlal Nehru, guided by his bosom friend and communist fifth columnist
Krishna Menon, cast aside the sage-like advice of Sardar Vallabai Patel, with
supreme contempt. At that point of time, Nehru as a petty politician was
interested only in clinging to his office of Prime Minister. He thought that he
had politically outwitted and checkmated Sardar Vallabai Patel. Indeed Nehru
seems to have been little worried about either the security of India or the
survival of India as a nation.
Sardar Vallabai Patel
was a stark realist. Quite unlike mercenary Nehru in post-independent India,
Patel was a true patriot with no private agenda for his family and his
successors! Nehru's attitude towards Patel was guided by his own favorite
philosophy: 'China is a communist country. It can do nothing wrong. Sardar Patel
is an obscurantist and aggressive Hindu and he can do nothing right – now or for
ever'.
Sardar Patel was
fully vindicated in 1962 when China invaded India. Even after this dastardly
invasion, Nehru stuck to his post of Prime Minister in a shameless manner, only
to lose his soul if he had any, for ever and ever.
– Continued
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