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Analysis
Reevaluation of
India�s Nuclear Program
by
Mukesh Williams, PhD
Synopsis
The paper concerns the
reasons for India going nuclear, the development of its nuclear program
and its rationale for its not signing the NPT and CTBT in spite of
advocating a non-violent foreign policy. The early stages of India�s
nuclear program were prompted by a perceived threat of China and later
of Pakistan. The success of the program was a combination of three
factors namely, a skilled organizational workforce, scientific
leadership and political endorsement. In this the contributions of the
IAEC, Homi Bhabha and the late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru played a
significant role.
India�s accelerated nuclear development in the 1960s
and 1970s was again prompted by the nuclear ascendancy of China and its
unilateral support to Pakistan as a buffer zone. India took advantage of
the positive connotations of nuclear technology in mid-twentieth century
and developed a thermal reactor thereby initiating a nuclear program
that would evolve into the nuclear explosive project. The explosion of a
nuclear device by China in 1964 initiated a debate in the Indian media
and political circles on the efficacy of developing a nuclear military
technology and the negative impact on its fragile economy. While the
Congress Party believed in international diplomacy to contain the
hegemonic intentions of China, the BJP and the Praja Socialist Party
argued for developing a military nuclear option. It was believed that
the military nuclearization of India would not contradict the pacifist
goals of Gandhian ideals that had infused its foreign policy. On the
contrary the theory of deterrence would protect the sovereignty of India
thereby making the ethical compromise pragmatic and viable.
The
secretive development of the nuclear program under Indira Gandhi and Homi Sethna culminated in the explosion of PNE at Pokhran in 1974 and
made Indian foreign policy more assertive. The changed geo-political
reality of the 1980s in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
pushed the United States closer towards Pakistan making Pakistan an
American ally to combat the threat of growing Soviet communism in the
region. With a supportive America, Pakistan took the Chinese help in
developing its own nuclear program aimed at containing India. Perceiving
a new nexus between Pakistan and China, India began to develop its own
missile technology. In 1996 the CTBT once again reiterated a time bound
framework for universal nuclear disarmament placing yet a new pressure
on India to contain its nuclear program. Sensing the closing of the
nuclear window India conducted five nuclear explosions at Pokhran to
bolster its image aboard and then place a moratorium on nuclear tests.
In the wake of these explosions there were worldwide condemnations and
the US, European powers and its allies like Japan placed economic
sanctions on India. India however continued to develop both economically
and technologically in subsequent decades and began to be perceived as a
responsible nuclear nation and a western ally in its fight against
terrorism. In 2006 the US signed a treaty with India initiating a
civilian nuclear transfer of technology beneficial to both countries.
Both the European and Japanese perceptions about India�s nuclear program
has changed from political belligerence to economic advantage. India has
always argued that the development of dual-purpose nuclear technology
would offer a cheap and effective resource to resolve economic and
social problems but this is debatable.
In a world wrought by extremely divisive forces, nations with advanced
nuclear and missile technologies act as deterrence to state-sponsored
violence and keep a check on the hegemonic ambitions of non-nuclear
nations. Today, it is not only enough to possess nuclear weapons but
also a sophisticated delivery system in the form of intercontinental
ballistic missiles to be taken seriously by other nations. In its
February 14, 2009 issue The Times of India reported that India would
test-fire ICBMs in 2010. By this date it would also acquire a submarine
launched ballistic missile technology (SLBM), and develop a ballistic
missile defense system (BMD) in order to offset its military
disadvantage and come closer to the exclusive club of nuclear nations
formed by America, Russia and China. In the light of these new
developments it is important to analyze the causes and motives that
forced India to go nuclear about four decades ago in spite of espousing
a non-violent foreign policy.
Early Stages of India�s Nuclear Program
India�s nuclear program began in the late 1940s when India gained
independence from Britain after over 150 years of protracted colonial
rule. The memory of American bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was
fresh in the minds of Indian leaders and the public, who felt the need
to develop an indigenous nuclear technology and military superiority to
prevent future colonization or hegemony by any other ambitious nation.
India began to see the U. S. model of using nuclear technology for
producing both domestic energy and providing military defense as an
ideal for its geographical and political situation. At the same time
India never lost sight of developing nuclear technology
indigenously�whether it was related to the mining and enrichment of
uranium and reprocessing spent fuel or the development of cryogenic
engines and supercomputers.
The beginning and success of India�s nuclear program was a rich
combination of perceived military threats and able political and
scientific leadership to address these threats. India�s nuclear program,
beginning in the 1960s and developing in the 1970s, was a direct outcome
of perceived security threats from China and Pakistan. The success of
the program owes in large measure to the dedicated efforts of the Indian
Atomic Energy Commission, its chairman Homi Jehangir Bhabha and the late
Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Together they provided the
impetus for a skilled workforce, a sophisticated infrastructure and
nuclear R&D to create a formidable nuclear defense plan for India that
would become the envy of many nations. The first one-megawatt thermal
reactor in India named Apsara went critical on August 4, 1956 paving the
way for the development of its dual-purpose nuclear technology.
In the early 1950s atomic R&D was viewed in the world as a positive
contribution by nations towards resolving their economic and social
problems. The development of atomic energy did not have the negative
connotations of �nuclear proliferation,� �mass destruction� or �global
threat� as it has today. India took advantage of this favorable
international climate and used the expertise of nuclear nations like
France, United Kingdom, Canada and the United States to build its own
nuclear technology. Of all these nations, Canada was instrumental in
helping India construct its nuclear program in the initial stages.
Briefly, the initial two decades, that is the 1950s and 1960s, were
basically developmental in nature as they provided India with the
nuclear expertise to expand its infrastructure and nuclear agenda into
what Lal Bahadur Shastri termed �the nuclear explosive� project.
The Nuclear Debate
From 1947 to 1964 India continued to develop its civilian nuclear
infrastructure keeping the military option open. But when in 1964 China
exploded a nuclear device, the act initiated a grand debate about the
security needs of India based on its nuclear threat perception of China
and Russia. India always saw communist China as a friend and often
raised the highly emotional slogan Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai, or
Indians-Chinese Brothers, Brothers. India never anticipated that a
border dispute with China would soon turn into a full blown conflict. In
1962 India fought a contentious border war with China and lost about
50,000 square miles of territory to it. The Sino-Indian conflict
revealed the abysmally poor defense system India possessed. The conflict
shattered the belief that a communist country would never threaten the
sovereignty of India. However, this perceived and real threat from China
did not push India into a nuclear arms race with China. India still
feared the debilitating effect of a costly nuclear development on its
fragile economy.
The Congress government wisely realized that, at the present moment, to
pursue international diplomacy in order to contain the hegemonic
intentions of China would be more suited to India�s needs. The
opposition parties did not share the government�s view. Both the Hindu
nationalist party, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and the socialist party, The
Praja Socialist Party, demanded the nation to develop a nuclear military
option to combat the growing hegemonic intentions of both China and
Russia. The intellectual elites, the media and the political parties in
India began to debate the pros and cons of a robust nuclear policy.
The Indian newspapers saw the Chinese nuclear policy as a �new menace�
to the world that directly affected India, its next door neighbor. Some
pacifists argued that India must not develop its own nuclear weapon
technology but instead seek nuclear protection from the US. Though the
United States president assured India of American help in the
eventuality of a nuclear attack, the US government was unwilling to make
a firm commitment. The lack of a clear assurance from the US made Indian
leaders feel that in case of an emergency, or a scenario where Russia
and China joined hands against India, American help may not be
forthcoming. India always considered verbal assurances somewhat
unreliable in international diplomacy, and rightly so. The US government
on the other hand was unwilling to make a firm commitment to India or
sign a treaty. Given the state of affairs it was felt that an
independent nuclear program would not only free India from depending on
the US or Russia, but also bestow prestige on the country for its
scientific prowess.
The Ethical Imperative
The Indian debate on �going nuclear� was fervently discussed under many
sub-themes including necessity and cost, but the most significant
sub-theme was the ethical imperative. It was felt that the nuclear
program would run contrary to the general non-violent ideals propounded
by Mahatma Gandhi and the pacifist principles of Panchsheel enshrined in
the Indian foreign policy. Obviously the pragmatists disagreed. They
argued that the threat posed by five nuclear nations to the security of
India was far greater than the ethical compromise. They further argued
that the theory of deterrence need not contradict the moral basis of
nonviolence, but in fact lend credence to it. Since China posed a
long-term threat to the security of India, China continued to shape
Indian foreign policy vis-�-vis nuclear disarmament and sanctions. It
was felt that even if China did not use the bomb on India, it would
threaten to use the nuclear option to blackmail and coerce India.
Therefore many intellectual elites felt that strengthening nuclear
security at high cost was a far greater priority for the government than
just worrying about fiscal development.
Soon the pragmatists were able to win over the moralists and the
idealists in their campaign to develop a nuclear option. Both the ruling
and opposition parties began to feel the need for developing military
nuclear infrastructure. Even from within the Congress Party pressure
began to mount on the government to produce its own �atom bomb.� The New
Delhi Pradesh Congress President Mustaq Ahmed voiced this concern by
suggesting that the time was right for India to develop its own nuclear
infrastructure. In November 1964 the Jana Sangh tabled a motion in the
Lok Sabha urging the Indian government to produce nuclear weapons. Mr.
Lal Bahadur Shastri who until now was opposed to the idea of a nuclear
program, began to be convinced that India should go nuclear. He modified
Jana Sangh�s motion by suggesting that India should develop �peaceful
nuclear explosives� in the near future. This paved the way for an
underground nuclear test called the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion
Project.
Response to Pakistan and China
The conflict with Pakistan also helped India to think more positively
about its nuclear program. In 1965 India and Pakistan fought a bloody
war to resolve the territorial dispute in Kashmir. In this conflict
China supported Pakistan creating a sense of crisis in India. China
threatened India with grave consequences if it proceeded with military
action against Pakistan. It is during this period that India�s
nonviolent idealism gave way to a pragmatic defense policy that included
the nuclear option. The political history of the 1960s in India amply
demonstrates this conclusion.
Though initially Indira Gandhi pursued a non-nuclear policy, the
thermonuclear test by China on May 9, 1966 and the nuclear missile test
on October 27, 1966 convinced her in favor of developing a nuclear
explosive technology. Also the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was
increasingly considered detrimental to the security interests of India,
as it did not attempt to contain the Chinese problem. On the contrary it
went on to legalize China�s nuclear status. India therefore refused to
sign the NPT in 1968. A survey in 1972 demonstrated that 68.9 percent of
Indians were not in favor of the NPT.
India always perceived China�s nuclear and rocket technology as a threat
to its security. On April 24, 1970 China tested a rocket carrying a
satellite in orbit. This once again raised India�s anxiety to a new
level. In response to the Chinese threat, IAEC chairman, Vikram Sarabhai
initiated a 10-year nuclear space program called the Sarabhai Profile
that would develop a missile delivery system for both civilian and
military purposes.
The Difficult 1970s and Pokhran I
In the midst of political and technological impasse, India began to inch
forward towards a nuclear option. Though the political crisis in the
1970s was obvious, the technological crisis was less obtrusive. The
Americans had refused to transfer the technology of super computers and
the Russians were coerced by Americans to deny cryogenic engines to
India. Denied help from both the superpowers India turned swadeshi. In
less than four years it was able to produce the supercomputer named
Param and develop its own brand of cryogenic engine. In 1974 India
conducted its first peaceful nuclear explosion or PNE at Pokhran,
nicknamed �Buddha Smile,� under the leadership of Indira Gandhi and Homi
Sethna, a test that was conceived much earlier by Dr. Raja Ramanna.
Though India vehemently denied that the test was a precursor to the
development of a formidable nuclear arsenal, the test did two things:
firstly it strengthened India�s nuclear option and secondly it opened
the way for the development of nuclear weapons. It can be argued that
India�s increasing assertiveness in foreign policy ran at tandem with
its nuclear strength. The nuclear testing at Pokhran created a quick
reaction and condemnation from countries like Pakistan, United States
and Canada for various reasons. Pakistan felt threatened. The United
States became concerned of a regional instability in the subcontinent
and Canada felt betrayed as the plutonium came from the Canadian CIRUS
reactor. However, most Indians were fully supportive of the nuclear
development.
The New Political Reality of the 1980s
The early 1980s saw a new realignment of superpower interests in the
South Asian subcontinent. We must remember that this is the period of a
Cold War between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet
Union. The American reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 pushed US interests closer towards Pakistan. The US needed Pakistan
to prevent Soviet hegemony in the region and expansion in the west. It
also needed Pakistan to buttress anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan.
The US tilt towards Pakistan reopened American military aid in the form
of financial assistance and supply of F16s to Pakistan. India began to
see a new threat from the growing alliance between the US and Pakistan
and between Pakistan and China. Furthermore India became deeply
concerned when it saw that China was directly helping Pakistan at Kahuta
and PINSTECH in Rawalpindi to build its nuclear and missile technology.
At one point India even contemplated surgical and preemptive strikes at
these two locations.
As a reaction to the new political realignment in the subcontinent in
1983 India initiated the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme
(IGMDP) under the direct supervision of the Defense Research and
Development Organization (DRDO). The IGMDP allowed India to integrate
its anti-tank, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface technologies in the
development of its nuclear missile program. In 1984 Pakistan�s Abdul
Qadeer Khan�s comment that his country possessed the capability to
produce weapon-grade uranium, accelerated India�s own nuclear program.
When in 1985 Pakistan tested a triggering device for a nuclear explosion
India�s threat perception of its neighbor was raised to a new height.
Rajiv Gandhi was well aware of Pakistan�s nuclear ambition and its
threat to India. Though he campaigned for global disarmament he did not
abandon the nuclear option or the use of nuclear technology for civil
use. By the early 1990s India had developed about two-dozen nuclear
devices to be deployed at short notice.
Retreat of the Soviet Union
The end of the Cold War in 1991 restructured the global strategic
balance. Apart from other geopolitical changes it also saw the breakup
of the Soviet Union. The restructuring weakened the diplomatic support
of the Soviet Union and supply of arms to India. From 1993-1995 China
threatened India by deploying nuclear warheads in Tibet. China also
assured Pakistan of helping it develop its nuclear and ballistic missile
technologies. It is in this background that the Kashmir issue flared up.
Pakistan began supporting insurgency in Muslim-dominated Kashmir and
threatened India with the use of nuclear device if forced into a tight
corner.
Besieged by China and Pakistan, depending on a weakened friend like the
Soviet Union for support, and criticized by western powers for pursuing
a nuclear program, India felt increasingly beleaguered. We must see some
of the subsequent developments in the light of this situation. Though in
October 1963 India had decided to join the Partial Test Ban Treaty it
consistently refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on moral grounds. As late as
1996, India voted against the UN General Assembly resolution endorsing
CTBT on the grounds that the resolution lacked a �time-bound� framework
for universal nuclear disarmament and a ban on laboratory simulations.
However though India rejected the terms and conditions of the CTBT,
major powers began using the provisions of the CTBT to put pressure on
India to either join it or curtail its nuclear ambition. Since India had
become a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) four of
its nuclear reactors had to comply with the IAEA security safeguard
standards. It became increasingly difficult for India to pursue a policy
of nuclear ambiguity. India began to realize that like China, sooner or
later, it had to accept the NPT and the CTBT. The rising power of China
and its unequivocal support of Pakistan further exacerbated India�s
anxieties. It is within these parameters that we must understand India�s
movement towards Pokhran II.
Pokhran II
In early 1998 when the Hindu BJP came to power, it wanted to realize its
election pledge of advancing India�s nuclear capability. In May 1998 it
conducted five nuclear tests under the leadership of Atal Behari
Vajpayee. It is argued that these tests were part of the party�s
strategy to bolster its image both at home and abroad. Subsequent events
revealed that this argument was not completely sustainable. Within a few
months of Pokhran II the BJP lost elections in three major states of
India, namely Haryana, Rajasthan and Delhi. However it must be
remembered that in 1995 the Congress Party under Narshima Rao also
wanted to test a nuclear devise but backed out under US pressure. It can
be said that the pressure of the CTBT became a diplomatic barrier that
India had to either break or succumb to. India chose to take a bold
stand and conduct its nuclear tests.
Over the years US sanctions against India have been lifted and European
and Japanese acrimony has also evaporated. In 2006 India and the US
signed a civilian nuclear transfer of technology which was considered
mutually beneficial. This has to do with a growing recognition in the
west that India is not only a responsible nation using nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes, but also a strong international ally
in fighting terrorism.
Conclusion
Though the development of the nuclear program has directly addressed
India�s anxieties regarding its neighbors, it is debatable whether
nuclear technology for civilian use is beneficial in the long run. It is
widely believed that nuclear energy would provide sustainable and cheap
electricity to India in the coming years. However many scientists argue
that this hope may be belied as it has been in other countries pursuing
the same goal. Nuclear technology has never proved to be a major
generator of electricity. On the contrary the dangers it poses to the
environment are far greater than its benefits. Though the deployment of
nuclear weapons is directly under the control and command of the prime
minister of India, the threat of nuclear weapons from countries like
China and Pakistan to the people of the Indian subcontinent cannot be
ignored. Even though India�s nuclear deterrence is enormous in the
region it still calls for a serious discussion on the ways nuclear
technology is utilized in future and the need for nuclear disarmament in
the subcontinent.
April 20, 2009
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