Opinion
Decline, Debasement
and Devastation in the
All India Services
A professionally competent and
politically neutral bureaucracy is a sine qua non for the smooth and
efficient functioning of a democratic polity. Thanks to the foresight and
vision of the founding fathers, our Constitution provided the framework
for a splendid administrative structure. The All India Services,
particularly the IAS and the IPS, constitute the very core of India�s
administrative fabric. These Services owe their establishment to the
vision and determination of Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel. He hoped that with
the ironclad guarantees incorporated in the Constitution, the Services
would resolutely stand by the Constitution and the law even under the most
trying circumstances. He also expected that they would play a pivotal role
in holding together a country of great disparities and diversity and
provide a uniformly high standard of administration at the Centre and all
the States. For some two decades the All India Services, by and large,
functioned as envisaged by the founding fathers. Then the decline started,
first slowly, and later at an accelerated pace. The nadir was reached in
Gujarat in recent weeks. The IAS and IPS have been laid prostrate. The
once superb administrative structure lies in ruins, reduced to a shambles.
Evidently these Services no longer serve the purpose for which they were
established.
In this paper I shall describe the process of decline and the causes for
the degeneration. I shall discuss at some length the developments in Bihar
and then briefly deal with the country as a whole.
Bihar
It was our singular good fortune that a number of able leaders, who had a
clear understanding of the tenets of democratic governance and could
distinguish between right and wrong, became ministers both at the Centre
and in the States when India became independent. Some of them had a hand
in shaping the Constitution. They all had a clear understanding of the
proper role of ministers and top civil servants in a parliamentary
democracy. By and large, civil servants gave frank, fearless and
well-considered advice. Ministers took decisions bearing in mind the
advice that the civil servants gave. Where the Minister did not agree with
the Secretary, the former would record his reasons and overrule the
Secretary. However, such instances were few. It was well understood that
the Minister was responsible for making policy, the civil servant�s role
being restricted to tendering advice. Implementation was the domain of
civil servants and ministers seldom interfered with implementation. The
system worked smoothly with reasonable efficiency. I had no personal
experience of the functioning of the Central Government in those days. But
I had the opportunity to watch from inside the working of the Bihar
Administration. I shall briefly describe how that administration
functioned in the decade of the �fifties of the last century.
I joined the IAS in 1951 and I was allotted to the Bihar Cadre. After a
few months� training in Delhi I reached Bihar in January 1952. During the
next ten years I held charge of two sub-divisions, spent three years in
the Home Department, first as Under Secretary and then as Deputy
Secretary, working directly under the Chief Secretary. From 1958 I was
Collector of Darbhanga for some two and a half years. During my first ten
years in Bihar the state administration was in fine fettle, functioning
smoothly and efficiently. That was the administration which the
distinguished professor of Public Administration Paul Appleby assessed as
one of the twelve best in the world. I witnessed the gradual decline of
that administration during the period 1962-1970 when I worked as Secretary
to Government, first in the Health Department and then in the Finance
Department. From 1970 to 1975 I was on deputation to the Government of
India. In August 1975 I returned to Bihar. The Administration had
degenerated further when I was away in Delhi. My second spell lasted about
three years. During that period I held in succession the posts of Finance
Commissioner, Resource Commissioner and Chief Secretary. Despite my best
efforts I did not succeed in making much improvement during my tenure as
Chief Secretary. I left Bihar finally in 1978. During the next two decades
Bihar acquired the reputation of being one of the worst administered in
the country.
Period of good governance and modest
progress
Bihar was a stronghold of the Indian National Congress before
independence. After independence the Congress continued to be the dominant
party and it ruled the state for two decades without break. Group rivalry
rooted in caste conflict was a significant feature of the Congress party
in Bihar before and after independence. The implacable antagonism between
the two dominant upper castes of Bhumihars and Rajputs was at the core of
the infighting in the Party. Chief Minister, Srikrishna Sinha, a Bhumihar,
had wide support in the party cutting across caste lines. Next only to
Rajendra Prasad, he was the tallest leader and he did not depend on other
ministers and legislators for his survival. His rival, Anugrah Narayan
Sinha, a Rajput, was decidedly number two in the Cabinet. He enjoyed wide
support among Rajputs. A few leaders of other castes also supported him.
But he was in no position to challenge the Chief Minister. Furthermore,
both men had worked together for decades in the freedom struggle, and both
had imbibed the values of the national movement. They respected each other
and so they could carry on for a decade without rocking the boat too much.
L.P. Singh of the ICS was the Chief Secretary. He enjoyed the trust and
confidence of both the Chief Minister and the Finance Minister. Singh was
a brilliant administrator, extremely hardworking and dedicated. He was an
excellent team leader who had the knack of getting the best out of his
team. The Chief Secretary was the nodal point of the administration. He
was also the Secretary to the Council of Ministers. All important cases
had to go to the Cabinet. The Chief Minister�s approval had to be obtained
through the Chief Secretary for including any item in the agenda for the
cabinet meeting. The Rules of Executive Business framed under Art.166 of
the Constitution contained certain provisions calculated to ensure that
every department would maintain a uniformly high standard. The first one
was a rule laying down that certain cases which need not go to the
cabinet, but were otherwise important, should be put up to the Chief
Minister through the Chief Secretary after the minister had passed orders.
The second one was a rule requiring the Secretary of the Department to
submit to the Chief Secretary the files in which the Minister�s orders
were not in conformity with the law or the accepted policy of the
Government. The Chief Secretary had also the power to call for any file
suo motu and, where necessary, advise the Chief Minister to overrule the
minister. I had seen a few cases in which the Chief Secretary intervened
to get unusual orders reversed. Though some ministers resented the
practice, they never protested. For the Chief Minister�s pre-eminence was
unchallenged. He was much more than first among equals. In later years
when Chief Ministers lost their primacy, those very rules proved to be of
no avail in reining in wayward ministers.
That was the state of affairs when Paul Appleby visited Bihar in the early
nineteen fifties. He found the administration functioning as it should in
a parliamentary democracy. The Chief Minister and his colleagues concerned
themselves with policy, which was invariably decided on the free and frank
advice of the Chief Secretary and his colleagues. Implementation was left
entirely to the bureaucracy and ministers seldom interfered. I know from
personal experience that even junior officers like Under Secretaries and
Deputy Secretaries enjoyed complete freedom to express their views without
any inhibition. So the actual practice approximated the ideal envisaged by
Sardar Patel in his speech in the Constituent Assembly on October 10,
1949. The Sardar had said, �Today my Secretary can write a note opposed to
my view. I have given that freedom to all my Secretaries. I have told them
that if they do not give their honest opinion fearing that it will
displease the minister, they should better go. I will find another
Secretary.� Though there were exceptions where civil servants behaved as
sycophants, the majority functioned as expected by Sardar Patel.
Unfortunately the idyllic state of affairs did not last long.
Both Srikrishna Sinha and Anugrah Narayan Sinha were old men in failing
health. The followers of both the leaders strongly felt that the issue of
succession should be settled when they were alive. In the General Election
of 1957 the Congress was returned with a decisive majority. The followers
of Anugrah Narayan Sinha persuaded him to challenge Srikrishna Sinha for
the leadership of the Congress Party. The canvassing by the rival groups
soon degenerated into a vicious campaign in which they resorted to all
manner of foul means, including the promise of office and bribery.
Srikrishna Sinha won by a handsome margin, but irreparable damage had been
done to the political process in Bihar. The politics of consensus and
conciliation gave way to the politics of confrontation and intrigue. The
Chief Minister was obliged to fulfill the promises made on the eve of the
contest. A number of supporters, including a few non-entities, were
appointed Deputy Ministers. They had little power; yet, they soon started
interfering in administration, particularly in postings and transfers.
L.P. Singh had already joined the Central Government. M.S. Rao, also of
the ICS, had succeeded him. Able, upright and experienced, Rao proved to
be an efficient Chief Secretary. He did not, however, have the kind of
close rapport that L.P. Singh had with the Chief Minister. Moreover, in
his declining years Srikrishna Sinha came under the influence of a small
coterie of self-seekers. Bihar�s administration started to decline slowly.
Yet, when the Chief Secretary or some other senior officer brought an
improper decision to the Chief Minister�s notice, he would intervene and
set things right. I remember instances in which Sri Babu rebuked Deputy
Ministers who tried to interfere with the power of the Heads of
Departments, particularly in the matter of postings and transfers.
I left the Secretariat in the middle of 1958 and worked as Collector of
Darbhanga till the end of 1960. Throughout my tenure as Collector I could
discharge my duties without any interference by ministers, legislators and
other public men. When the District Boards were superseded and put under
the Collector�s charge, a couple of Deputy Ministers tried to influence me
in the postings and transfers of District Board doctors. I told them
politely but firmly that I would not accede to their requests. That was
the end of the matter.
I could also extend effective protection to upright officers who happened
to displease powerful politicians. That was possible mainly because a man
like Sri Babu was the Chief Minister. I shall narrate briefly two
instances to prove this point. The Maharaja of Darbhanga owned two sugar
mills in the district. There were two rival labour unions, one of the
Congress and the other of the Socialist Party. The intense rivalry and
bickering between the two unions often led to violence and breach of the
peace Both the Subdivisional. Officer and the Deputy Superintendent of
Police were upright men. I had assured them of my support as long as they
acted firmly and impartially. When the local Congressmen failed in their
efforts to influence the officers, the politicians started a vicious
campaign against them. They complained to the Labour Minister and the
Chief Minister. The Labour Minister visited Darbhanga and after looking
into the matter told me that he felt that the SDO and DSP had been partial
to the Socialist Union. He did not accept my assessment. The Congress
leaders intensified their campaign against the officers. A few days later
the Chief Minister came to Darbhanga. He looked grim and visibly angry.
When we were alone in the Circuit House I asked him why he was angry and
what had upset him. He said that it disturbed him that his young officers
were favouring parties opposed to the Congress. I narrated the facts and
requested him not to reach any conclusion without looking into the matter
personally. Suddenly he became relaxed. The tension was gone. He laughed
loudly and assured me that there was no question of his reaching a
conclusion in haste. In due course, after thorough examination Government
came to the conclusion that the officers had acted correctly.
There was a Union Deputy Minister who was rather self-opinionated and was
also a bully. He would visit his constituency three or four times in the
year and spend several days there. He was in the habit of humiliating in
public the Block Development Officers and their staff. Once he made a
frivolous complaint against a BDO. He wanted me to place the officer under
suspension forthwith. I told him politely that I would look into the
matter and send a report to Government. He was not at all satisfied. On
inquiring into the matter I found that the officer had not been at fault.
I sent a report to Government explaining the facts. The upshot was that
the Chief Minister gave a dressing down to the Deputy Minister. Thereafter
for several months the Deputy Minister did not visit his constituency.
When he came later he behaved normally.
I shall narrate one more small incident. The Chief Minister was scheduled
to open a new Community Development Block in Madhubani Subdivision. A
local leader of the Congress organized a luncheon in honour of the Chief
Minister. He invited all senior officers also to the lunch. He was a
muscleman and bully and often he used to terrorize the people. When he
came to invite me I told him politely that I would not be able to attend.
I discussed the matter with the Commissioner. He told me that he would
accompany the Chief Minister. He added that if I had serious reservations
I should myself speak to the Chief Minister. Accordingly, I spoke to the
Chief Minister. I told him why I would not attend the lunch. The Chief
Minister replied that I was free to act as I liked. He added that he did
not have a choice. For, as a politician he was often required to associate
with all manners of people including some undesirable elements. Looking
back I am convinced that it was the presence of a man like Sri Babu at the
helm of affairs that enabled officers of my vintage to act impartially and
fearlessly. We could effectively deal with wrong doers even if they
enjoyed political patronage. The personality of the Chief Minister is the
most important factor preserving the administration of a state in good
condition.
During that period an administrative structure penetrating deep into the
countryside was established. The community development programme was
implemented with vigour. Natural calamities were handled with competence,
communal peace was ensured and law and order was maintained with a firm
hand. It has, however, to be conceded that institutional reforms, social
justice and democratic decentralization did not get the required priority.
Though a good beginning had been made in primary education, the tempo
could not be maintained. Yet, on the whole, Bihar remained a
well-administered State. Young officers like me could look forward to the
future with confidence, hope and optimism.
Onset of decline and degeneration
In December 1960 I returned to the Secretariat as Joint Secretary in the
Finance Department. Sri Babu died soon after my return to Patna. His
successors were first Binodanand Jha and then Krishna Ballabh Sahay.
Neither of them had a large personal following. Their survival depended on
the continued support of powerful group leaders. Neither enjoyed the
prestige or authority of Sri Babu. They could not rein in wayward
ministers. Civil servants began aligning themselves with individual
ministers.
I was Health Secretary for about five years from mid-1962 to mid-1967.
Thereafter I worked as Finance Secretary for two and a half years from
mid-1967 to the end of 1969. Harinath Mishra was the Minister when I
joined the Health Department. A couple of years later Abdul Qayum Ansari
succeeded him. Indiscipline was rampant in the Health Department. Intense
lobbying to secure plum postings was the order of the day. Ministers,
legislators, bureaucrats and other influential people openly pleaded the
cause of their proteges. Hari Nath Mishra was an honest politician. He
approved my proposals to bring about some system and objectivity in
postings and transfers and put an end to lobbying. But those efforts met
with only limited success. Though Mishra was well meaning, he could not
resist the pressure from influential politicians. During Ansari�s regime
things took a turn for the worse. Doctors succeeded in getting desired
postings by resorting to bribery. On the eve of the General Election of
1967 the Minister sent down over one hundred transfer orders from his camp
office. Many orders violated the guidelines. More than one doctor was
posted to the same place and in some cases the same doctor was posted to
more than one place. If the Minister�s orders were implemented the result
would have been utter confusion and further demoralization. I refused to
carry out the orders and reported the matter to the Chief Minister through
Chief Secretary. Chief Secretary supported me and the Chief Minister
decided that the Minister�s orders should not be implemented. All the
doctors who had paid money were naturally unhappy. The rumour was that in
the beginning the cost of securing a favourable order was Rs.5000 to
Rs.10, 000. As the election approached and it was felt that the Congress
would be defeated, the amount of bribe came down to as little as a couple
of hundred rupees. Corruption had become widespread in other departments
also. In the Works Departments corruption had existed since a long time in
the matter of awarding contracts. Now bribes were freely offered to secure
transfer to particular posts, and even for getting promoted to higher
posts. The six years following the death of. Sri Babu witnessed a sharp
fall in the quality of Bihar�s administration. Though Krishna Ballabh
Sahay was a very able administrator, he could not stem the rot, as he was
dependent on quite a few unscrupulous men for his survival. He did not
have the authority to check his erring colleagues. Powerful Ministers
began functioning as they pleased. Soon several officers aligned
themselves with such ministers and avidly helped them in the abuse of
power. The administration was in a deplorable state by 1967.
The Congress was defeated in the General Election of 1967. A number of
small parties with conflicting goals and ideologies formed an amorphous
coalition to run the government. For a while there was some reduction in
the level of corruption, but indiscipline continued unabated. The internal
contradictions in the coalition led to the fall of the government before
it completed one year. A number of short-lived coalitions followed some of
which remained in power for only a few weeks. In one extreme case a
government was in office for only a couple of days. The decline got
accelerated. During those years to stay in power the Chief Minister was
obliged to placate every little group, some of them making utterly
unreasonable demands. The office of Chief Minister lost its pristine
grandeur and authority. In the winter of 1972 while staying in the Circuit
House at Saharsa I happened to see the then Chief Minister being buffeted
and abused by an angry crowd of legislators and politicians. I could not
believe my eyes. For Bihar was the state that some fifteen years ago Sri
Babu had ruled with unquestioned authority and supreme dignity.
Debasement
I was on deputation to the Central Government from the end of 1969 to the
middle of 1975. When I returned to Bihar in July 1975 I noticed that the
administration had degenerated further. As Finance Secretary I found that
the finances of the state were in a precarious condition. Financial
discipline had evaporated. In an age in which the administration had no
access to telephone or wireless the British rulers had included in the
Treasury Code a rule (Rule 27) empowering Collectors to draw money from
the treasury in anticipation of formalities to meet emergencies like
floods, earthquakes, devastating fires etc. To my dismay I found that
Collectors had been freely drawing money for all manner of purposes under
Rule 27. In one extreme case a Collector had drawn money under the rule to
help the Subdivisional Officer of another district to buy a staff car. I
am narrating this simply to illustrate that all checks and balances had
disappeared. There was no accountability and anyone could do what he
pleased. Resorting to a number of harsh measures I could restore a measure
of financial discipline. But the administration continued to be in
disarray.
Even during the Emergency, contrary to popular belief, there was no
improvement in the level of efficiency. In the General Election of 1977
the Congress was badly beaten. The Janata Party, which was a loose
alliance of discordant political groups, came to power. The Chief
Minister, Karpoori Thakur had known me from my days as Collector of
Darbhanga, his home district. When he was Deputy Chief Minister and
Finance Minister in 1967-68, I worked under him as Finance Secretary. We
respected each other. Soon after taking over as Chief Minister, Karpoori
Thakur told me that he proposed to appoint me Chief Secretary. There were
five officers senior to me in the Bihar Cadre posted at that time in
Bihar. I suggested that he should appoint one of them to the post of Chief
Secretary. I also told him that I wished to go back to the Centre. A week
later the Chief Minister told me that it was the unanimous decision of the
Council of Ministers that I should be the Chief Secretary. I replied that
as a disciplined civil servant I had no option but to accept the post. I,
however, added that Bihar�s administration was in a mess and that I could
be effective only if he agreed to certain conditions. These included
appointing officers handpicked by me to key posts, substantial delegation
of powers and non-interference in delegated powers. Within a few days of
joining as Chief Secretary I found that these conditions were not met.
Right from the beginning I found it difficult to persuade the Cabinet to
fill key posts on the basis of objective considerations. Lobbying for top
posts continued to be the order of the day. Ministers were always on the
lookout for officers of their own caste or pliable men. Often outstanding
officers were overlooked. In a few cases ministers preferred corrupt and
incompetent men. Many officers succeeded in evading transfer orders by
resorting to lobbying. Inspite of instructions issued from time to time,
interference in day-to-day administration, particularly in the matter of
postings and transfers continued unabated. Ministers and legislators were
taking a great deal of interest in the transfer of even non-gazetted
personnel. Heads of Department and District Officers who resisted such
interference were bullied and humiliated, politicians made frequent
statements denigrating individual government servants and the bureaucracy
in general. The morale of the bureaucracy, which had already been low,
went down further.
A few unusual incidents made it obvious that all my efforts to stem the
rot would be frustrated. One morning I happened to see a news item
prominently featured in the local dailies saying that the Director of
Public Instruction had been suspended. Under the Rules of Executive
Business no senior officer could be suspended without obtaining the
approval of the Chief Minister through the Chief Secretary. I had not seen
the case. When I spoke to the Education Secretary he told me that he too
had not seen any such file. A couple of hours later the Education
Secretary reported to me that he had just received a minute from his
Minister directing him to suspend the Director and submit a note the same
day confirming that the order had been implemented. The Minister had not
even bothered to draw up specific charges. I asked the Education Secretary
to send the papers to me and inform his Minister. I submitted the file to
Chief Minster pointing out that it would be wrong to suspend the officer
without even knowing what were the charges against her. The Chief Minister
accepted my advice. But when the Minister threatened to resign on that
issue, the Chief Minister caved in. The officer was suspended and
proceedings were drawn up. Eventually no charge could be proved. I came to
know that though the Director was an efficient and upright officer, she
happened to incur the Minister�s displeasure for the simple reason that
she was not pliable. That incident had an extremely bad impact on the
morale of the administration.
Soon lack of discipline reached such alarming proportions that ministers
and officers started issuing press statements attacking each other. Two
ministers wished to occupy the same house. They decided to take the law
into their own hands. Each sent his Personal Assistant with a section of
armed police to take possession of the house. Finally the District
Magistrate passed an order under Section 144 of the Cr.P.C. restraining
both Ministers from occupying the house. Newspapers flashed the news on
the front page. Bihar�s administration became a laughing stock.
When the atrocious behavior of
some legislators came to my notice I asked the Additional Inspector
General of Police, Intelligence to make a secret enquiry. After a few days
he reported that there were 44 legislators with criminal records, equally
shared by the Janata Party and the Congress. I discussed the matter with
the Chief Minister. I asked him why he could not weed out the criminals.
He frankly confessed his inability to do anything because most of the
criminals enjoyed the support of some of the top leaders of his party.
When I realized that there was absolutely no chance of the administration
being revamped, I left Bihar in April 1978. The years since then have
witnessed further degeneration and total devastation. In recent years
Bihar acquired the reputation of being the worst administered state in the
country. In my well considered view the top politicians and members of All
India Services are equally responsible for bringing about the ruin. For,
if at least one half of them had lived up to the expectation of Sardar
Patel and resolutely stood by the Constitution and the law, the tragedy
could have been averted. Alas, that did not happen! The charismatic Laloo
Yadav bestrides the narrow world of Bihar politics like a colossus. He is
his own master, and unlike his mentor Karpoori Thakur, he can be ruthless
and decisive. He had the opportunity to set things right and pull Bihar up
by the boot-straps. Unfortunately, his priorities are lopsided, and
conditions have worsened under his stewardship. It is no consolation to
the long-suffering people of Bihar that several states have joined Bihar
on the road to ruin.
Other States
Though the degeneration started early in Bihar, soon the other states
followed suit. In the General Election of 1967 the Congress Party was
defeated in several states. An assorted bunch of small political parties
and splinter groups with little in common but opposition to the Congress
and love of office came to power. Thanks to intense infighting, the
situation was not much better even in the states under Congress rule. All
over the country, barring a few exceptions, Chief Ministers became
prisoners in the hands of conflicting political parties or groups. To
survive they were obliged to placate numerous petty politicians. The new
breed of ministers with tenuous tenures was on the look out for pliable
bureaucrats. There was no lack of unprincipled opportunists in the
bureaucracy. Before long, a large number of civil servants aligned
themselves with individual ministers and became active collaborators with
disastrous consequences for the administration.
After crushing her rivals, Indira Gandhi acquired total control of the
Congress Party early in the �seventies. Inner-party democracy was snuffed
out and free election of office bearers of the party was abolished. The
great party of Gandhi, Nehru and Patel with a tradition of vigorous
inner-party democracy was reduced to a plaything in the hands of Nehru�s
daughter. Chief Ministers of some stature and personal following like V.P.
Naik and Devaraj Urs were eased out with thoroughness worthy of a nobler
cause. Chief Minsters came to be chosen purely on the basis of loyalty to
the supreme leader, totally ignoring the factors of ability, integrity and
popular support. Several non-entities and lightweights lacking
administrative acumen and political standing were pitchforked into the
office of Chief Minister. Those developments had a devastating influence
on public administration in states ruled by the Congress Party. The
further decline following the declaration of internal emergency will be
discussed in later paragraphs.
Government of India
I joined the Central Government in November 1969. After a brief stint in
the Ministry of Health and Family Planning I spent the rest of my tenure
in Delhi in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Planning Commission as
Land Reforms Commissioner. I had no opportunity to observe personally from
a nerve centre the functioning of the Central Government. Therefore,
unlike in the case of Bihar, my understanding of the decline of the
Central administration is based on my observation from the periphery and
what I heard from friends or read in newspapers and journals.
Soon after joining the Health Ministry I observed that senior officers
were rather reluctant to express their views frankly. Many of them would
mould their views to please the superior officer or minister. On one
occasion the Secretary did not like what I had recorded in a file. He
discussed the matter with me and asked me to take back my note. He wanted
me to write another note on the lines suggested by him. I told him
politely that I would not revise my note. The Secretary became angry and
told me that it was an accepted practice to revise notes after discussion.
I told him that I would stick to my stand. Thereafter our relations became
strained and I proceeded on leave. After my leave I joined as Land Reforms
Commissioner in the Ministry of Agriculture. Concurrently I held the same
assignment in the Planning Commission. In that post I happened to work
with four Secretaries. I had cordial relations with all of them. Even when
we differed, none of them ever suggested that I should reconsider my
stand.
At the Centre the decline started much later than in Bihar. For the first
twenty- five years after independence the system was in reasonably good
shape. During that period the country tided over the perils and trauma of
partition. The threat of administrative collapse was averted. The
integration of princely states exceeding five hundred in number,
attainment of self-sufficiency in food, the adoption of planned economic
development and the survival of democracy were the significant
achievements of that period.
Decline and Degeneration at the Centre
From around 1973-74 the administration started to decline at the Centre.
It was then that some persons in authority ridiculed the concept of a
politically neutral bureaucracy and advocated its substitution by a
committed civil service. The ham-handed handling of the popular mass
movements against the corrupt regimes in Bihar and Gujarat resulted in
great public anger and dissatisfaction. The government of Indira Gandhi
was fast losing its moral authority. The departure of men of ability,
integrity and vision from the Prime Minister�s inner councils coincided
with the usurpation of political power by a small coterie headed by Sanjay
Gandhi. I shall narrate a trivial incident which presaged the shape of
things to come. In the years immediately preceding the Emergency a close
friend of mine had been working as the General Manger of the Super Bazar
in Delhi. A crony of Sanjay Gandhi started frequenting the Super Bazar and
telling the staff how the goods should be displayed. He also added that he
was acting on behalf of the Prime Minister. When his meddling became
intolerable, the General Manager complained to the Prime Minister�s Joint
Secretary. The latter put up the letter to the Prime Minister with a note
suggesting that the busybody should be warned. The Prime Minister�s
reaction was unbelievable. She wrote that she was a busy person and that
it was not always possible for her to express her wishes in writing.
Sometimes her orders would be conveyed verbally by people close to her!
Perhaps the Prime Minister did not realize that she was opening the
floodgates to the blatant abuse of power and the subversion of the system.
The declaration of internal emergency was a watershed. Prior to the
emergency the administration was, on the whole, in a reasonably good
shape. Emergency dealt a crushing blow to the administration, particularly
at the Centre and in the State of Haryana. A week before the declaration
of emergency I had proceeded on leave preparatory to my reversion to
Bihar. I did not work under the Central Government during emergency. So my
understanding is based on what I heard from friends. As I was on leave, I
woke up rather late on June26, 1975. I came to know about the declaration
of emergency from the single sheet issue of the Delhi edition of
Statesman, the only newspaper that came out in Delhi on that day. All
India Radio was playing some banal music. Switching on the BBC I gathered
scrappy information about the declaration of emergency. I got ready
quickly and went to the Agriculture Ministry. I met the Secretary Triveni
Prasad Singh and Minister of State Annasaheb Shinde. Both were stunned.
Annasaheb told me that the telephone lines of Jagjivan Ram and Y.B. Chavan
had been disconnected. He added that probably they were under house
arrest. As I was on leave, I could spend the whole day meeting senior
officers in the Ministry. I also looked up a Joint Secretary in the Home
Ministry who had already started work on a white paper. I spent the next
few days gathering information about the manner in which the momentous
decision was taken and the persons responsible for the decision.
I was shocked to learn that the emergency had been declared without the
Cabinet�s approval. Home Minister Brahmananda Reddy heard about it only at
the Cabinet meeting held at 6 A, M. on June 26. Cabinet Secretary B.D.
Pande came to know only when he was asked in the small hours of June 26 to
convene an emergency meeting of the Council of Ministers. Even the Prime
Minister�s Secretary, P.N. Dhar, was not in the picture. A couple of days
earlier the Home Secretary Nirmal Mukherjee had been shifted to the
Ministry of Civil Aviation because of the apprehension that he might prove
to be inconvenient. In his place a pliable officer from Rajasthan was
airlifted and posted as Home Secretary. On the night of June 25 top
leaders including Jayaprakash Narayan, Morarji Desai and others were
arrested without the knowledge of the Home Minister and other Ministers.
The Prime Minister took the ominous decision to declare emergency on the
advice of a small clique headed by her younger son Sanjay Gandhi.
Siddharth Shankar Ray was roped in to provide legal advice. The President
signed on the dotted line. All the checks and balances built into the
Constitution crumbled, Parliamentary democracy was annihilated and the
Cabinet ceased to be the repository of executive power. Throughout the
emergency a small gang headed by Sanjay Gandhi usurped all the powers of
the Government of India. An assortment of hatchet men, opportunists and
sycophants gained access to the levers of power.
No minister or senior bureaucrat raised any objection to the declaration
of emergency or the manner in which it was done. A few experienced deep
agony; and a large number felt uncomfortable. But many IAS and IPS
officers enthusiastically collaborated with the authoritarian regime.
Without any regard for the Constitution and the laws of the land, they
executed illegal orders and cheerfully functioned as instruments of
tyranny. The impact of the emergency was most severe at the Centre and in
the state of Haryana adjoining Delhi.
During the emergency the great institutions of our federal democratic
polity, which had already been under attack, were undermined and severely
eroded. The important institutions under attack included Parliament and
State Legislatures, the Cabinet System of governance, the office of the
Chief Minister, the limited autonomy enjoyed by the States, the judiciary,
the bureaucracy and the press. The rule of law was dispensed with and
constitutional proprieties were cast aside. All checks and balances built
into the Constitution crumbled. An extra-constitutional junta headed by
Sanjay Gandhi exercised supreme executive power. Mercifully, Sanjay
Gandhi�s interests were rather limited. So in areas outside his sphere of
interest the administration functioned as in the past, with the difference
that many officers availed of the opportunity to act arbitrarily.
Among the States the most
severe impact of the emergency was experienced in Haryana. That State had
already acquired notoriety for arbitrary governance. The emergency
provided an excellent opportunity to Chief Minister Bansi Lal to commit
unbelievable excesses. IAS and IPS officers who were unwilling to
collaborate were bullied into submission. The official machinery was
blatantly misused to wreak vengeance and carry out vendetta. In one
extreme case a District Employment Officer who did not accede to the
wishes of Bansi Lal�s son was harassed and imprisoned. The Supreme Court
Judge who inquired into the excesses committed during the emergency came
to the conclusion that Bansi Lal had been guilty of the abuse of power and
that he had behaved like a medieval despot.
In the other states also democratic governance yielded place to arbitrary
exercise of power. Many civil and police officers availed of the
opportunity to act arbitrarily on their own without any direction from
political superiors, Throughout the emergency I worked in the Finance
Department. Chief Minister Jagannath Mishra was in charge of the Finance
Department. He did not pass any arbitrary and illegal order as Finance
Minister. During the emergency the distinction between the government and
the party in power vanished. Sanjay Gandhi and Congress President Baruah
made two or three visits to review progress in the implementation of the
so-called Twenty Point Programme. As luck would have it, I was not
required to attend those sessions. In spite of the draconian measures
adopted during emergency there was, however, no improvement in efficiency.
Devastation and break down
In the General Election held in 1977 immediately after the lifting of the
emergency the Congress was trounced. The Janata Party, which came to
power, was a fragile makeshift alliance of discordant political groups.
Though institutions like the Cabinet System and Parliament regained
strength, before completing one year in office the government fell under
its own weight. Indira Gandhi�s return to power in 1980 ensured that the
great institutions of our federal democratic polity would not regain their
former strength. The next two decades witnessed the exponential growth of
the evils of corruption, criminalisation and electoral malpractice. Though
early on during his tenure Rajiv Gandhi showed some awareness of the
problem, soon he came to terms with the rotten ambience. His successors
also did not try to stem the rot. As a result of perverse personnel
policies pursued by successive Central and State Governments, public
administration became dysfunctional. Governments no longer govern. Law and
order has broken down in large parts of the country and some Metropolitan
cities. Citizens no longer enjoy security of life and property. The
primary purpose for which the State was set up is not being served. The
Social Contract has collapsed. Communal, class and caste conflicts often
leading to rioting, arson and slaughter have become endemic. The
magistracy and the police have often been reduced to helpless spectators.
Occasionally they have added fuel to the fire by their partisan conduct.
During 1993-95 I had occasion to study the state of the Land Revenue
administration in all the states as the Chairman of a Committee appointed
by the Government of India. An extract from the report of the committee is
reproduced below:
�In all states routine is neglected and senior officers seldom attend to
their all-important functions of field visits, inspections and
supervision. Corruption and inefficiency are so rampant that members of
the public find that they cannot get anything done without greasing the
palms of the functionaries concerned or bringing to bear great influence
on them. Well-meaning and efficient Collectors who try to bring about an
improvement in the situation often find their efforts frustrated. They are
unable to take any disciplinary action against erring subordinates who
have access to peddlers of influence. The main reasons for this state of
affairs are the pursuit of perverse personnel policies and mindless
political interference in day-to-day administration, particularly
establishment matters. In several states ministers routinely interfere in
the postings and transfers of even low-level field staff appointed by the
Collector. The expression �political interference� does not adequately
describe what goes on. In reality what happens is the blatant misuse of
public office for pecuniary gain. Touts, power brokers and peddlers of
influence are having a field day all over the country. These unhealthy
developments have led to thorough demoralization in the bureaucracy,
rampant indiscipline and all round inefficiency. It is high time that
effective steps are taken to stem the rot and put an end to this sad state
of affairs.� (Report of the Committee on Revitalization of Land Revenue
Administration-Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, March
1995, page 12).
I shall now briefly refer to a
few major events that clearly demonstrate the break down of governance and
the abdication of responsibility by the All India Services. During the
first two decades after independence communal clashes and tension were
endemic in many places. The administration was scrupulously impartial.
Criminal elements of all communities were firmly dealt with. From the late
�sixties in several states the lower echelons of the administration,
particularly police outfits like the Provincial Armed Constabulary of
Uttar Pradesh, started showing bias against the minorities. The serious
communal riots of Meerut and Bhagalpur exposed the lethargy and negligence
on the part of the civil and police administration. Even so, the Council
of Ministers and the top echelons of the administration continued to be
unbiased. During the riots in Delhi in the wake of the assassination of
Indira Gandhi the administration did not act with speed. Some prominent
leaders of the Congress played an active role in fomenting trouble. The
administration let them go scot-free.
The destruction of the Babri Masjid was an important climacteric in the
decline of the administration. Though the Hindu fanatics had given a clear
indication of their intention, no effective step was taken to protect the
mosque. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao temporized and allowed things to
drift. Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Kalyan Singh openly connived in the
destruction of the shrine. The top IAS and IPS officers present at Ayodhya
failed in discharging their duty. That incident badly tarnished the image
of Indian administration; it was shown to be toothless and biased. The
riots that followed in Bombay and other places were not handled
efficiently. The police did not intervene effectively to maintain public
order.
Then followed several incidents that showed the IAS and IPS in very poor
light. A case in point is the Fodder Scam of Bihar. Several IAS officers
were alleged to have acted culpably and some were imprisoned. Another
instance is the role of the top police officers of Tamil Nadu in
humiliating Ex-Chief Minister Karunanidhi. In recent years all over the
country members of the IAS and the IPS have shown a marked tendency to
carry out the wishes of their political masters without pausing to
consider if the action was in accordance with the law. Many of them have
been behaving like servile hatchet men and not as members of elite
services owing unshakeable allegiance to the Constitution, the laws of the
land and the principles of democratic governance. It is true that the
major share for this sad state of affairs should rest with the new breed
of politicians who have scant regard for the Constitution and the laws of
the land. They have no qualms about abusing power to garner illegal gains
and carrying out personal vendetta.
In recent weeks the State of
Gujarat under the stewardship of Narendra Modi witnessed .the complete
ruin and devastation of the All India Services. Gujarat was a
well-administered state some three decades ago. The decline started with
the regime of Chimanbhai Patel. He was succeeded by a number of Chief
Ministers under whom the downturn gathered momentum. According to M.N.
Buch, a perceptive observer of the degeneration of the Gujarat
administration, under those Chief Ministers nepotism, corruption and
favoritism became rampant. The interference in day-to-day administration
filtered down to postings of even police constables, patwaris and other
low level employees. With the coming to power of the BJP, political
interference continued in a more organized manner. A large number of RSS
and VHP activists were inducted into Class III and Class IV posts,
particularly into the police force and the Home Guard organization. The
administration became thoroughly demoralized.
Such being the state of affairs in Gujarat at the time of the Godhra
carnage, Chief Minister Narendra Modi, a staunch RSS pracharak of long
standing, faced little resistance in ensuring that the Civil and Police
administration remained inert during the so-called Hindu backlash.
According to a report published in the OUTLOOK of June 3rd, the Chief
Minister discussed the law and order situation with the Chief Secretary,
the Director General of Police and other senior officers on the night of
February 27, a few hours after the Godhra incident. It is alleged that the
Chief Minister said that the next day during the bandh called by VHP there
would be justice for Godhra and that the police should not come in the way
of the Hindu backlash. Narendra Modi is reported to have snubbed the DGP
who expressed some doubts. Thereafter the top IAS and IPS officers meekly
knuckled under the bullying tactics of a political leadership bent upon
violating the Constitution, the rule of law and the basic principles of
democratic governance. The All India Services abdicated. Govardhan
Zadapiya, a VHP activist functioning directly under Modi as Minister of
State in the Home Department took charge of the Ahmedabad Police
Commissioner�s Control Room. Another minister issued instructions from the
State Control Room. For several days inhuman and hitherto unheard of
atrocities were perpetrated against Muslims. Eye-witness accounts and
videotapes have documented the gory details of barbarous crimes.
The Gujarat riots were unique. For the first time since independence a
Chief Minister and his cabinet colleagues played a proactive role in
rendering the law and order machinery inert and permitting Hindu fanatics
and gangsters to have the free run of the state for several days. Under
the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Police Act, the sole
responsibility for the maintenance of public order rests with the
magistracy and the police. The law assigns no role to the Council of
Ministers in the maintenance of law and order. When the Chief Minister
gave an illegal order it was the plain duty of the Chief Secretary and the
Director General of Police to ignore that order. They should have
instructed the District Magistrates, Police Commissioners and
Superintendents of police to take effective steps to maintain public peace
exercising all the powers vested in them under the law. It was also the
duty of the DGP and the Commissioner of Police to throw out of the Control
Rooms the interlopers. Of course, the senior officers ran the risk of
incurring the wrath of a vindictive and ruthless Chief Minister.
Considering the Constitutional protection enjoyed by the members of the
ALL India Services, the risk was no more than that of being transferred.
It was, indeed, a crying shame that no IAS or IPS officer in top positions
offered any resistance at all when the Constitution, the laws of the land
and the principles of civilized governance were trampled under the feet.
Summing up
In the preceding paragraphs I have described the process of decline
drawing attention to the causes that led to the degeneration. Now I shall
briefly recount the important causes that led to the degeneration. The
decline of the great institutions of our federal democratic polity was a
prime cause. The decline of the Cabinet system and the degeneration of the
legislatures also adversely affected the administration. As far as the
states are concerned, the most ruinous development was the sharp decline
in the stature and authority of the Chief Minister. These developments
were a direct consequence of the snuffing out of inner party democracy in
the Indian National Congress and the concentration of all power at the
top. The mass politics of the early years gave way to manipulative parlour
politics. Blind loyalty to the top leader became the sole criterion for
the selection of Chief Minister and ministers. Several persons unfit to
hold public office were pitchforked into high office. The period also
witnessed the weakening of the Congress Party in several states and the
emergence of new political formations with no clear ideology. For long
periods unstable coalition governments lacking in cohesion ruled many
states. The only cementing force was greed and the anxiety to cling on to
power. More often than not a Chief Minister heading a coalition was a
prisoner in the hands of self-seeking ministers. Such governments seldom
functioned with a sense of purpose.
Another important development since the mid �seventies of the last century
was the growth of a malignant syndrome embodying large-scale corruption,
criminalization and electoral malpractice. The unhealthy socio-political
environment facilitated the emergence of a breed of cynical politicians
with no faith in the Constitution and the laws of the land. They looked
upon electoral victory as licence to abuse power, help cronies and amass
huge fortunes. The total absence of transparency and accountability in our
political system facilitated these deadly developments. A few bureaucrats
felt uneasy, but the great majority got on to the bandwagon and either
acquiesced in the wrongdoing or shared the loot. Long before the Gujarat
carnage the country was heading towards administrative collapse. The
recent events in Gujarat simply revealed that for a long time the
administration had been rotten to the core.
Conclusion
It is often argued that since the All India Services no longer serve the
purpose for which they were established, they should be wound up. This is
a counsel of despair. It is certainly true that the bureaucracy being an
integral part of the polity, efforts to rejuvenate the administration
should be preceded by thoroughgoing political and electoral reforms and
other measures to pull the polity out of the morass. These should also
include a war on corruption and criminalization, drastic devolution of
powers as envisaged in the 73rd Amendment of the Constitution,
transparency in the management of public affairs, and strict enforcement
of accountability at all levels. There is little hope of all these things
happening in the near future. The recent reaction of the political parties
to the modest efforts of the Supreme Court and the Election Commission to
introduce reforms shows how difficult it will be to bring about even
modest electoral reforms. The political scenario is, indeed, depressing.
Even so, there are two good reasons for retaining the All India Services
and trying to rejuvenate them.
In the first two decades after independence we had both at the Centre and
in the states ministers who had faith in the Constitution, the rule of law
and the principles of democratic governance. Unfortunately, many of the
ministers and other political leaders of the present day have no faith in
the Constitution and the law or in democratic practices. So, there is
greater need today than at any time in the past for the All India Services
wedded to the Constitution and the law. They can offer considerable
resistance to illegal actions of the politicians in power.
Secondly, recent experience in
Gujarat confirms the need to retain and strengthen the All India Services.
A great deal has been written and said about the devastation and utter
failure of the All India Services. Unfortunately adequate light has not
been shed on the performance of a handful of fearless officers who stood
by the Constitution and the law. When all over the state the Police
acquiesced in the nefarious activities of the Sangh Parivar, the
Superintendents of police of Kutch, Bhavnagar, Banaskanta and Bharuch
accorded effective protection to Muslims. They exercised their powers
under the law and, where necessary, used force against troublemakers. In
one case in which a Commandant of the Home Guards, an erstwhile VHP
activist, had stabbed an old Muslim woman and her grandson living in an
isolated dargah, the Superintendent of Police took drastic action. He drew
up a First Information Report, arrested the culprit and sent him to
prison. Not only that, he stood firm when a minister and a member of the
Chief Minister�s staff tried to browbeat him. Of, course he and the other
three officers were subsequently transferred. But the four officers have
the satisfaction that they did their duty in extremely trying
circumstances in Gujarat�s darkest hour. I have no detailed information
about the performance of all the IAS and IPS officers. In all probability
there are others also who discharged their duties fearlessly. These
instances prove that it will be disastrous to wind up the All India
Services. If only the Chief Secretary, the DGP and a number of senior
officers had displayed the same fearlessness and dedication, the Gujarat
carnage could have been averted or at least mitigated.
After having watched Indian administration for half a century I am firmly
of the view that the All India Services should continue. The President is
the guardian and the Supreme Court the very palladium of our Constitution.
But they are beyond the reach of ordinary citizens. It is a civil and
police administration fearlessly upholding the Constitution and the rule
of law that will enable millions of Indian citizens to enjoy the rights
guaranteed under the Constitution. Abolition of the All India Services
will certainly lead to a worsening of the situation.
A question that merits urgent
consideration is what practical steps can be taken to restore to the IAS
and IPS, at least partially, the ethos and �lan that existed some four
decades ago. Admittedly, noticeable success can be achieved only after the
cleansing of the Indian polity by introducing far reaching political and
electoral reforms. There is little hope of that happening in the near
future. In the meantime we have to be satisfied with small practical steps
to improve the morale of the All India Services and bring about marginal
improvement in their performance. There is also the pressing need to
extend moral and material support to the few fearless officers who perform
their duty with remarkable dedication. This matter deserves to be
discussed at a brainstorming session to be attended by some knowledgeable
people who have not yet succumbed to despair and cynicism.
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