Democratic
constitutions which mandate separation of powers rest on three main organs
of the State, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. In most
constitutions other than Indian the civil service per se is not even
mentioned. Under the American Constitution the executive power of the
United States rests in the President. Whereas there are officers to assist
him the executive power of the United States is not exercised through
them. In other words the concept of an independent civil services does not
exist in that country. Under Article 58 of the German Constitution orders
issuing in the name of the Federal President or on his directions require
the counter signature of the Federal Chancellor or a Federal Minister.
Under Article 65 it is the federal ministers under the directions of the
Chancellor who are required to conduct the affairs of their departments.
Of course there are civil servants in Germany, but they work as directed
by the ministers and are not in themselves independent executive
authorities.
The Indian Constitution represents a departure from other democratic
constitutions in that it recognizes a fourth organ of the State, the
permanent executive or the civil servants. Under Article 53 of the
Constitution the executive power of the Union is vested in the President,
which is to be exercised by him either directly or through officers
subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. Article 154 makes
a similar provision mutatis muttandis regarding the Governor and
officers subordinate to him. In exercising his executive powers the
President or the Governor, as the case may be, will be aided and advised
by the Council of Ministers appointed by him under Articles 75 or Article
164 respectively, whose advice will be binding under Article 74 and 163
respectively. However, the distribution of work between ministers will be
determined by the President or the Governor under Business Allocation
Rules framed under Article 177 and 166, but the business of government
will be conducted under the Business Rules framed under Article 77 and
166. Since clause 2 of both these Articles states that the authentication
of instructions made and executed in the name of the President will be
done as prescribed by rules and the said rules vest the power of
authentication in a Secretary to government, it is clear that the
executive itself is divided into two parts. The first consists of the
Council of Ministers, which is constituted from members elected to the
legislature, to each one of whom is allocated a department on whose
affairs he is required to advise the head of state, the said advice being
binding, but in the authentication of the orders emerging from such advice
it is the officer concerned who is authorized and it is he who is
responsible for implementing the orders.
What dos this distinction mean? The Council of Ministers represents the
will of the people during its tenure as expressed through the vote. The
Council is required to frame policy, give guidelines and initiate
legislation, all of which will bear the imprint of the ideology or program
of the political party or parties in power. In an elective democracy it is
perfectly valid for the party in power to have a program which may be
radically different from that of the party in the opposition provided that
the program does not transgress the Constitution. The ruling party has
every right both to legislate and to prescribe the policy for the
implementation of its program. An excellent example of this is the post
Second World War Labour Government in Britain which adopted socialism as
its ruling philosophy and legislated for nationalizing of large sectors of
the economy. Many years later when Mrs. (now Lady) Margaret Thatcher
became Prime Minister she ordained the dismantlement of the socialistic
policy of nationalization and brought about a major political and economic
change in Britain. However, in both cases it was the civil servants who
were required to implement the policy which, to the credit of the British
Civil Service, its members did with considerable competence. Certainly
most of the civil servants serving the first Labour government came from a
background which militated against nationalizing the economy, but they
nevertheless implemented the policy of government faithfully.
In India, too, it is the civil servants who are required to implement
policy because Articles 53 and 154 of the Constitution require them to
exercise the executive power of the State under the orders of the
President or the Governor and on his behalf. Under Article 74 and 163 the
policy would actually be that of the Council of Ministers, which means
that the civil servants exercising authority on behalf of the President or
Governor are actually doing this on the orders of the Council of
Ministers. However, because our Constitution distinguishes between
officers appointed by and subordinate to the President or the Governor and
the Council of Ministers, the civil servants acquire a status of their own
which is independent of the Council of Ministers. This independence does
not mean that they are not subordinate to the ministers also, but this is
subordination limited to implementing policy. It is not a subordination
arising out an employer-employee relationship. Whereas I shall revert on
this issue in due course, I am supported in my view by Part XIV of the
Constitution, which lays down the provision relating to the civil
services, their appointment, removal and terms of service and the method
of their selection through an independent Public Service Commission which
enjoys a specific constitutional status. I am not aware of any other
constitution in the world which has the equivalent of Part XIV of the
Indian Constitution.
Within Part XIV is contained Article 312 which constitutes the All India
Services. This is a unique feature in what is a federal constitution
because the federally constituted and administered All India Services also
man the senior posts within the respective cadres in each of the states.
At present there are three All India Services, the Indian Administrative
Service, the Indian Police Service and the Indian Forest Service and
between them they hold all the important posts in the central and state
governments. Normally in a federal set up the central and state
governments have their own independent cadres of officers. In India the
cadre controlling authority for the All India Services is the Government
of India and not state governments. Part XIV of the Constitution
prescribes that recruitment at specified levels will be done through an
impartial process overseen by a Public Service Commission, there will be
security of tenure and removal or punishment will only be by due process
of law. Even the lowest level of government servant is entitled to such
due process. The civil services under our Constitution enjoy a high degree
of immunity from arbitrary action by politicians or by vested interests.
The All India Services enjoy a double protection because their cadre
controlling authority is not the government of the state in which they
serve but the Government of India, which is not subjected to the daily
pulls and pressures of politics in a state.
I shall revert to the issue of immunity from arbitrary action and the
reasons why such immunity is included in our Constitution, but at this
stage I would like to harp back on my theme that the executive itself
consists of two parts, the elected as represented by the Council of
Ministers and the permanent as represented by the civil servants. Civil
servants have the following main tasks:
To assist the
Council of Ministers in the framing of policy and, in particular, in
preparing the necessary documentation which would make it possible to
implement a given policy.
To frankly
advise the Council of Ministers about the possible consequences of a
particular policy proposal or proposed legislation, including pointing
out the consequences of change as a result of the new law, its financial
implications, legal ramifications, if any, and the probability of public
acceptability of the change. Of course the final decision will rest with
the Council of Ministers which may or may not accept the advice
rendered,
Once the
policy is decided, to quickly prepare the guidelines, rules, etc., which
would put the policy into effect,
o implement
the policy faithfully,
In
implementation of policy, to ensure absolute fairness, justice and
even-handedness. What this means in effect is that the policy will be
implemented across the board and not selectively, as often desired by
politicians. In implementation no one, not even the Council of
Ministers, should interfere except to check deviation, monitor timely
implementation and ensure that the civil servants do not apply their own
prejudices and biases in implementation.
After the
policy is decided and implementation begins the civil servants must not
permit any interference because it would either slow down implementation,
favor a particular party or promote certain interests at the cost of
others. To elaborate slightly, government decides on a policy of
prescribing the ceiling on land holdings. The competent revenue officer
would now be required to ensure that surplus lands are identified and
taken over by government for such redistribution as may be prescribed. The
identification and taking over of surplus lands has to be systematic,
universal, and not selective. Very often politicians intervene in such
cases and request the authorities to go slow in the case of certain
favored people. In a system where the civil service is politically
appointed such discriminatory application of a policy may be practiced,
with only the courts intervening if petitioned by an aggrieved party.
Under the Indian dispensation a civil servant cannot be asked to apply a
policy selectively and as per the mandate given to him by the Constitution
he is required to act independently, reject any attempt at influence or
interference and apply the Ceiling Act across the board to all persons
having surplus land. The Constitution gives him the authority to do this
and in fact enjoins a duty to act impartially. The elected executive
cannot interfere in such matters, because the civil servant acting
according to law is not subordinate to any one.
Two examples would illustrate this point even better. A postman is
virtually a ruler when distributing the post. He is required by law to
deliver the mail to the address and the addressee recorded on the envelop
and not even his Post Master General can direct him to deliver the mail to
an unauthorized third party. The postman is totally independent in
performing his duties. His superiors can intervene only if he deviates
from the path of duty. Similarly a traffic policeman on point duty is a
ruler for the purpose of directing traffic. Even his Inspector General
cannot order him to let traffic converge at ninety degrees as this would
lead to accidents. When a traffic policeman holds up his hand to stop
traffic coming from a particular direction even the President of India
must obey his signal. Every tahsildar, inspector of police, food
inspector, land surveyor or any other official doing about his duty as
mandated by law, rules or standing instructions, is independent and if
someone is annoyed with him of doing his duty he must not hesitate because
he enjoys the protection of Part XIV of the Constitution.
Why were the civil services given an independent status and constitutional
protection? When the Constitution was being framed Sardar Vallabhbhai
Patel, the then Deputy Prime Minister played a role which was in no way
less important than that of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in ensuring that India had a
constitution which would be as strong on practical implementability as it
was on ideology. Sardar Patel realized that unlike the old Thirteen
Colonies which came together at the time of independence to become one
nation voluntarily relinquishing necessary powers to the federation, India
was a country put together by the will of the imperial master, Great
Britain. This is not to state that there was not an underlying unity of
Bharatvarsha, but the political entity that we call India is the legacy of
the Indian Empire of which the British Monarch was King Emperor. Such a
federation and, for that matter, even the US federation, has both
centripetal and centrifugal forces and because of the immense diversity of
geography, ethnicity, language, culture and religion these forces are
simultaneously equally but paradoxically strong in India. Sardar Patel
carried the conviction that we must build into the Constitution certain
binding forces which would ensure centripetality without detracting from
the unity in diversity theme so basic to our country. Therefore, an
analysis of the Constitution would show that whereas India is a Union of
States (Article 1), whereas parliament itself has a Council of States
which represents the states and which must be consulted in anything which
affects the basic status of the states, whereas Article 246 and the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution prescribe the exclusive legislative
competence of the federal parliament and the state legislature, thus
giving a degree of sovereignty to the states, there are also equally
strong features of the Constitution which prescribe how there will be a
unitary thread running all the way through the Constitution. Some of these
unitary measures are:
Whereas the
council of ministers in a state is headed by a Chief Minister who is
appointed by the Governor because he enjoys the confidence of the House,
the Governor himself is appointed by the President under Article 155 and
will hold office during the pleasure of the President under Article 156
of the Constitution.
The Seventh
Schedule which gives the legislative competence of parliament and the
state legislatures also has List III, the Concurrent List, which gives
simultaneous jurisdiction on the prescribed subjects to both parliament
and the state legislature under Article 254. In any matter enumerated in
the Concurrent List the law made by parliament will prevail over the law
made by a state legislature in case of conflict or repugnancy. The
Concurrent List has been expanded from time to time by constitutional
amendments.
In the US
Constitution the judiciary is divided between the federal judiciary
which interprets and applies federal laws and the state judiciary which
interprets and applies state laws. Of course the Supreme Court has
overarching jurisdiction but the state and federal judiciaries have
their own hierarchies and their own respective jurisdictions. In India,
however, there is only one judicial set up in which the subordinate
judiciary ranging from the lowest civil or criminal court and up to and
including judges of the district and sessions court are appointed by the
Governor of the state concerned in consultation with the High Court and
in accordance with rules framed in consultation with the High Court and
Public Service Commission control over the judiciary vests in the High
Court as per Article 235. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence
over all courts and tribunals within the jurisdiction of a High Court
vests in that High Court. Judges of the High Court, in turn, are
appointed by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of
India and the Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President
in consultation with and on the advice of a Collegium of Judges as
prescribed by the Supreme Court. The High Courts and the Supreme Court
are courts of record and the law declared by the Supreme Court is
binding on all courts under Article 141 of the Constitution. The courts
are competent to adjudicate on all laws, whether made by parliament or
the state legislatures and together the entire judicial set up from the
lowest court up to the Supreme Court forms a pyramid. The courts are a
tremendous binding force.
Part XI of the Constitution prescribes the relations between the Union
and the States. Article 248 vests residuary powers of legislation in
parliament. The position in the US is that as per Article 10, which was
added through an amendment, the residuary powers vest in the states.
Under Article 249 parliament may legislate with respect to a matter of
State List if the Council of States resolves that it is in the national
interest to do so. Similarly under Article 250 parliament acquires the
right of exclusive legislative jurisdiction during proclamation of an
emergency.
Under Part XI
the administrative relations between the Union and the States are also
prescribed. Under Article 257 the Union Government may give directions
to the States on how to exercise executive power in certain matters.
Under Article 262 and 263 parliament can legislate in matters relating
to inter state water disputes and the President can establish an inter
state council to advise on disputes which may arise between states.
Part XII of
the Constitution gives the financial relations between the Centre and
the States in which, once again, the federal government has a major
role.
Part XVIII of
the constitution gives the emergency provisions in which on the
proclamation of an emergency under Article 352, a proclamation under
Article 356 in which the President takes over the functions of a state
because the state is no longer being run as per the provisions of the
constitution and a proclamation under Article 360 when the President
declares a state of financial emergency, the executive and legislative
powers of the state would be transferred protem to the union
counterparts. The German Constitution does have Articles 35, 37, 84 and
91 which permit federal intervention in the Lander (States) in certain
cases, but there is no provision for dismissal of a state government and
the taking over the administration by the President.
The Armed
Forces themselves are a tremendous binding force because they are of a
truly national character.
Sardar Patel
saw in the civil services, especially the All India Services, an
instrument for the strengthening of the centripetal forces which bind
India together. Sardar Patel was of the view that the All India Services
as represented then by the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the Indian
Police (IP), though inherited from the British, had the experience, the
nationwide loyalty and ability to provide stable administration, though
under a changed national and democratic government. The reason why the
Constitution has provision for All India Services which serve both the
federal and state governments, have federal protection and are
constitutionally immunized from arbitrary action by the State, is that
Sardar Patel firmly believed that if India were to survive as a democratic
but united nation it must have built into its administrative structure an
element which could provide stability, impartiality and even-handed
implementation of policy. That is the reason why the Indian Administrative
Service (IAS), the Indian Police Service (IPS) and later the Indian Forest
Service (IFS) were created as successors to their counterpart British
Indian Imperial Services. It is to the credit of these services that by
and large they have hitherto remained true to their salt. However, the
fabric of the Services, which had begun to fray at the edges, is now in
serious danger of structural failure.
1967 was the watershed year for the Civil Services. For the first twenty
years of independence we were led by stalwarts who had been tempered in
the crucible of the freedom movement, were sure of themselves, had a feel
of destiny, were austere in their personal habits, had a commitment to the
nation, were prepared to take decisions and certainly did not feel
threatened by the Civil Services. Such political masters are easy to serve
because they welcome impartial and frank advice, base their decisions on
ideology and the realities of the ground situation and are prepared to
back up the civil servants entrusted with implementation of policy.
However, in 1967 everything changed overnight because this is the year in
which in states such as Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana,
etc., party loyalties were broken by purchase of legislators and
governments were bought through bribes. Suddenly the legislators found
that they could command a price for supporting a government and that
selling themselves to the highest bidder was a permissible political
exercise.
In order to pay bribes money is needed and it can only be forthcoming by
subverting the State and misusing power. As a strong, impartial and honest
civil service is an obstacle in the path of political corruption
therefore, such a civil service must be broken. Transfer, posting of
pliant officers in key positions and marginalizing of those who are
straightforward, the playing of favorites and open encouragement to
corruption were used to break the homogeneity, morale and integrity of the
civil services, especially the All India Services. The Indian
Administrative Service and Indian Police Service became the main targets
because whereas the former occupied the top administrative posts, the
latter was the main coercive force available to the politicians. I have
already stated that the civil services, especially the All India Services,
are well protected against arbitrary action and it is to the utter shame
of the All India Services that instead of standing firm they surrendered
abjectly.
It may be worthwhile quoting a few examples. Tamil Nadu has always been
considered to be a state in which the Services have been strong, united
and bound by the rulebook. That is the state which has experienced the
disgrace of a former Chief Secretary being arrested for assisting the then
Chief Minister to amass wealth, whereas the police has acted like the
hired goondas of the main in power, first Karunanidhi and then
Jayalalitha. When Karunanidhi became the Chief Minister just prior to the
present regime of Jayalalitha, he asked the Police Commissioner of Madras
to arrest Natarajan, Jayalalitha’s Secretary. Without an FIR being
registered and with no preliminary investigation to establish a prima
facie case the police immediately ordered the arrest of Natarajan. When
pressure was built on Karunanidhi to retrace his steps he ordered the same
police immediately to release Natarajan and dropped the cases against him
and this was done without the formality of obtaining a magistrate’s order
on a final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. requesting permission to close
the case. It is the same police force which dragged Karunanidhi out of his
bed at 0200 hours and tried to arrest N Ram and other senior editorial
staff of The Hindu. The law is very clear. Under Chapter XIV of Cr.P.C.
the police is bound to record a first information of an alleged cognizable
offence. Before the FIR is recorded the police has no power of
investigation. Once investigation begins no authority, including the
Supreme Court, can intervene in investigation except in the case of grave
miscarriage of justice. Despite this our senior police officers invariably
succumb to political pressures in the investigation of offences and as an
excuse cite the non-implementation of the recommendations of the National
Police Commission to justify their own pusillanimity. When the
constitutional protection of Part XIV of the Constitution does not give
courage to these officers, can the implementation of the half-baked
recommendations of NPC, which probably are not worthy of implementation,
make them courageous?
It is invidious to quote a personal example to prove a point, but I shall
be so fool hardy. Perhaps the best-drafted law post independence was the
Bonded Labour Abolition Act. The Act clearly identifies bonded Labour,
gives steps for freeing of Labour from bond, provides for rehabilitation
and empowers executive magistrates to summarily try people who keep bonded
Labour and sentence them to up to three years rigorous imprisonment with
fine. In 1984, shortly before I sought voluntary retirement from service,
I was summoned to the cabinet and asked by the Chief Minister whether my
department had posted inspectors under the Act in Bilaspur Division. When
I replied in the affirmative the Chief Minister told me that these
inspectors were harassing cultivators, five of whom happened to be present
in the cabinet, all from Bilaspur and all booked under the Act. The Chief
Minister asked me to tell the inspectors to go easy in enforcement and to
ignore the more stringent provisions of the law. I told him that I cannot
do so because both he and I had sworn an oath to uphold the laws of the
land. In any case if I did give such instructions, in one case they would
ignore the law because I told them to do so and in nine cases they would
take bribes and ignore the law. I would not be able to distinguish between
the two types of cases. On this the Chief Minister became a trifle annoyed
and told me that my obstreperousness would make agriculture very difficult
in the state. On this I sought ten minutes to prepare a letter from him to
the Prime Minister, pointing out the difficulties in implementing the Act
and requesting its repeal. A horrified Chief Minister told me not to do so
because the Act was a fine piece of social legislation. In other words,
have the law on the statute book because it reads well, but do not
implement it and thus engender a general disrespect for law because a
person who could escape the consequences of keeping bonded Labour might be
encouraged to think that he could escape the consequences of dacoity, rape
or murder. I have quoted this example to show that a civil servant doing
his duty can and must point out to the politicians the consequence of an
act which is illegal or improper. It is sad indeed that officers have
stopped doing so.
Why have the civil services stopped performing their vital function of
giving correct advice fearlessly to the political executive? Why have the
Services virtually abdicated their function of implementation of policy
and why do civil servants take orders from ministers even in the matter of
details of implementation? In short, why have the civil services stopped
being the fourth pillar of the State as envisaged by our Constitution?
Partly, of course, the blame lies with the politicians, the new breed of
which has value systems which are totally different from those expected of
responsible participants in the political process in a democracy. The
first requirement of a parliamentary democracy is that there should be
political parties with a strong ideological base and a program designed to
serve that ideology. Civil servants have no problem with implementing an
ideology-based program of the ruling party, provided they are not asked to
do so in a biased manner. Like the British Civil Service, the Civil
Services in India are trained and designed to carry out the just, proper
and legal orders of the political executive. From this emerges the second
axiom that politicians who strive for power should be prepared to quit it
if the electorate so ordains. They should be prepared to accept electoral
defeat without abandoning their ideology or program; in the same manner as
did Lady Margaret Thatcher. It is only when in order to avoid such defeat
that politicians abandon ideology and adopt a perceived populist stance
that problems arise. When reason departs and populism take hold every
decision becomes one of the momentary expeditiousness and civil servants
are asked to do favors to undeserving people merely because politicians
feel that this will enable them to retain their vote bank. One cannot
allow a system based on such naked patronage to exist because thereby it
is only the law abiding who will suffer. In India as successive elections
have shown, there is a competitive populism which has made a mockery of
laws, systems, canons of propriety and even ordinary commonsense. It is
immaterial that such decisions beggar the exchequer, destroy institutions
and negate even medium term planning, leave alone the long term. It is
immaterial that such steps encourage criminality and are an open
invitation to corruption. What matters is the politician’s own perception
of whether this will give him a few more votes. No organized civil service
can function properly under these circumstances.
The Constitution and the framework of laws enacted under it do in fact
give the civil services adequate authority to oppose unreasonable
populism. The police is answerable to law and not to an individual
politician or bureaucrat. A bureaucrat is answerable to law and is bound
by rules and he is certainly not expected to carry out whimsical orders.
The fact, however, remains that pure whimsy and arbitrariness often
prevail and bullies such as Jayalalitha, Mayawati or even Bal Thackeray
terrorize officials to do their bidding. During the recent Gujarat riots
the Police Commissioner of Ahmedabad allowed two ministers to take over
his control room and prevent the police from doing its duty to maintain
law and order. Both the ministers should have been arrested on the spot
but this was not done. This happened because the Police Commissioner did
not do his duty and the Chief Secretary, the Home Secretary and the
Director General of Police of the State did not give protection to the
Services and allowed the politicians to ride rough shod over them. Who
suffered? It is the people who were subjected to the fury of rioting.
It is easy for me to pontificate on the duties of a civil servant and what
is expected of him vis a vis the politicians. That is because I do not
have to face the fate of many civil servants in states such as Bihar, UP
and Tamil Nadu, all of them ruled by Chief Ministers (I do not include
Mulayam Singh in this category) who are either megalomaniacs or totally
indifferent to the rule of law. Civil servants tread in fear in such
states. That is where the paradox lies. The Constitution and the law give
sufficient protection to the civil servants provided they are prepared to
endure hardship. The politicians who have a duty to uphold the
Constitution, on the other hand, are prepared to terrorize the civil
servants so that under fear of the whip they knuckle under and participate
in wrong doing. The paradox is that though the Constitution is
specifically designed for them to meet such situations fearlessly, in many
cases they fail to do so. I would put the entire blame on the civil
services, especially the All India Services.
One should try and understand the deleterious effect of break down of
civil service morale. An honest and impartial civil service is good both
for the people and for the politicians. Only such a civil service can
deliver the goods in terms of implementation of government policy and
promoting development. Proper implementation of policy and the successful
completion of development projects is what brings credit to a ruling party
and it is for the politicians to cash in on this. Supposedly working in an
environment of anonymity a civil servant can neither claim credit nor
needs to do so because he is not participating in a popularity contest. If
the civil service is honest the level of bribery would dip appreciably and
people would be able to get their work done without having to make illegal
payments. If the civil services, including the police, do their job
according to law there would be law and order, an absence of rioting and a
general environment of peace and tranquility, without which no development
is possible. A biased police force may be liked by a political party, but
the end result would always be a Gujarat type situation in which all
communities suffer because there is no law and order. Even in the matter
of decentralization, once the policy is to decentralize through devolution
and not merely through delegation, an efficient civil service would
provide the mechanism through which such devolution occurs and there is
genuine decentralization of power. Incidentally, I would not go along with
the criticism that it is the civil service which opposes devolution. At
the central and state levels the civil services have adjusted very happily
to the process of democratic decision making and they have no problems
with this democratic process being carried down right up to local
government level. As has been proved in MP, it is the politicians,
especially the ministers and the legislators, who are most opposed to
genuine decentralization because this cuts into their power and to counter
which a ‘neither here neither there’ form of district government has been
devised in which real power rests with the minister in charge and
Collector and not the Zila Panchayat.
One fall out of the break down of systems and institutions is that
corruption has become rampant because every decision is adhoc. How can the
civil services, including the All India Services, remain immune from this
disease? My experience is that the process begins with the civil servant
initially not resisting corruption, progressing thereafter to becoming a
junior partner in the process, then equal partner and subsequently even
beginning to suggest to the politicians new and better methods of graft.
This is the real nexus between the civil services and the politicians in
the matter of corruption, with the civil services often playing a vanguard
role. This is not what Sardar Patel had envisaged when he recommended
inclusion of Part XIV in the Constitution. In a way I consider the civil
servants, especially members of the All India Services, who have gone
along with the situation, as traitors to the nation because they have
betrayed the trust, reposed in them by the Constitution. For such persons
no punishment is too harsh, including capital punishment, because that is
how traitors should be treated. Just as in the Nuremberg trials orders of
superiors were not accepted as an excuse for war crimes, senior civil
servants should not be allowed to plead force majeure as an excuse for
failing to do their duty and indulging in corruption and worse.
When one talks to people one sometimes hear remarks such as a particular
officer being efficient though corrupt. A corrupt officer cannot be
efficient. He may be able to do a politician’s bidding. In a particular
case he may be able to achieve a particular thing because he is prepared
to cut corners, but in the final analysis the harm that this does will
cancel out any good and ultimately it is the system which is damaged. It
is only the honest civil servant, who is prepared to observe the rules and
treat everyone even-handedly, who can efficiently and honestly implement
the policies prescribed by the political executive. In the long run this
is much more effective than adhoc implementation, which is the only thing
of which a corrupt civil servant is capable.
Under our polity the role of the civil service as laid down in the
Constitution still holds validity. This includes the constitution of All
India Services under Article 312 because our federation continues to be
different from federal set ups such a s the United States of America. The
fissiparous forces, especially along the periphery of India, are still
strong. Even in heartland India we need a unifying force which can bring a
semblance of settled government according to the rule of law to states
which have become politically volatile. The Constitution itself has many
centripetal features to reinforce which need the All India Services. What
is more, because the weak point of any Westminster type of democracy is
that without proper checks the tyranny of majoritarianism can develop, we
need civil services which will hold the scales even for the minority
groups by ensuring even-handed application of policy. The civil services
have to be free, fair, frank and independent in action; in other words,
the pre 1967 position must be restored. How can this be done?
Every democracy requires a set of rules by which the democratic game is
played by all the players. It is a well known axiom that political parties
must agree to disagree, i.e., there must be agreement that each party can
have its own ideology, other parties may disagree with this ideology but
on certain fundamental issues there has to be agreement. One area of
agreement has to be that there will be even-handed application of law,
rules and policy. Civil servants who uphold this principle should not only
be accepted by all political parties but should be supported in doing
their duty. Where, however, there is no agreement to disagree there can be
no impartial civil service because it would not be allowed to function. If
political parties resort to unashamed populism at the cost of policies and
programmes, there can be no impartial civil service because it would be
opposed to adhocism. Therefore, the first reform needed is that political
parties have to accept the rules of the game of democracy. Unless they do
so one sees very little chance of rebuilding the civil services.
Having said that the fact remains that the Constitution does recognize the
civil services and, in particular, the All India Services, as
constitutional entities. Independent of whether the parties reform
themselves the Services have to introspect and restructure themselves. A
beginning should be made with the All India Services in which a drastic
process of weeding out the useless, the corrupt, the slovenly and the
laggards must be set in motion. If we have to amend the All India Services
Act and the rules framed thereunder for this purpose, we should do so. A
new system should be introduced in which after one year’s training in the
three service academies officers should be sent in the field. On
completion of a sub division they must be brought back to their respective
academies for a six months course in which they exchange their
experiences, access a properly put together library of case studies to see
how specific issues are dealt with by different officers at different
times and hone up their professional skills. Thereafter they must go back
to a district charge. In the tenth year when the officers are beginning to
show signs of moving to higher responsibilities they must again be put
through a training course. At this stage I shall refer to the IAS, but
similar procedures should apply to the IPS and IFS mutatis mutandis,
keeping in view the more specialized requirements of these services. Ten
years of service is the time when there should be assessment of an
officer’s aptitudes and he should be put through a rigorous course of
training which would lead him towards more focused and specialized skills.
The officer should then return to a posting to be pulled back once again
on completion of fifteen years of service to undergo an even more rigorous
course of training with an even greater focus on an area of
specialization.
On completion of twenty years of service the IAS officers (and their
counterparts in other All India Services in their own specialized fields)
should be sent on a two years sabbatical. If the officer chooses to go
abroad government should pay the full cost involved. If, however, he
chooses an institution or university in India, government should pay him a
lump sum amount which would roughly be the difference between the cost of
training abroad and the cost of training in India. This would be an
incentive for the officer to chose an Indian institution. During this two
years period the officer has to do original research on a subject of his
choice, obviously related in some way with his service career, resulting
in a thesis which would be subjected to a very rigorous examination by a
panel of experts. If the thesis and its subsequent viva voce defence is
found acceptable the officer would be entitled to the award of a
doctorate. If it is found that the officer has been unable to or has
otherwise failed to live up to expectations he should be immediately
retired as being unfit for higher responsibilities. At every stage an
officer must be under observation and if it is found that he is wanting in
application, is not motivated, has not kept in touch with the latest
trends in administration, has not lived up to the highest standards of
integrity and morality and has not maintained an independent and impartial
stance, he must be removed from service. The armed forces have no
hesitation in doing so in the officer cadre. We should not hesitate in the
case of civil services.
Peer pressure is important. In the old days the civil services tended to
be drawn from a narrow spectrum of class, educational background and even
economic status. There was a homogeneity in ‘the biradiri’, but this did
also give a certain exclusivity which kept out those from a less fortunate
background. Now the services are much more broad based, which is as it
should be in a democracy. Unfortunately the virus of caste has crept in
and this has made the services less homogeneous, not in composition but in
the general approach of officers to the administration as such. We have to
restore to the civil services, through training, motivation, percept and
example, a psyche and an attitude in which there will be very similar
reaction of officers across the board to a given situation. Thus, if undue
pressure is brought on an officer to do something which is not proper and
if he refuses to do so, shifting him will not help because the next
officer will also do exactly the same thing. In other words, the reaction
of the civil services to a situation in which they are required to deviate
from duty would be almost identical and the officers would refuse to do
that which is improper. Our training academies and senior officers at
every stage must indoctrinate the officers in behavior and attitude so
that regardless of the officer’s personal background he will react
positively to that which is good and negatively to that which is improper.
Our academies are probably not equipped to undertake the above type of
indoctrination. I am not talking of regimentation but rather of the
development of a code of behavior to which all officers adhere. It is the
academies which must evolve such codes and then make it second nature for
the officers to adhere to the code. This can bring about a fundamental
change in the behavior pattern of the civil services. Once the behavior
pattern changes there will be peer pressure on officers to further the
good and reject the improper and it is this peer pressure which will
really reform the civil services. In this behalf a weighty burden falls on
the All India Services which are supposed to be in the vanguard of the
administration.
We also have to find a way in which arbitrariness in postings and
transfers can be avoided. The administrative tribunals which were set up
to give protection to civil servants against arbitrariness have failed.
One reason for such failure is that these tribunals have become the refuge
of retired judges and civil servants who really have no stake left in the
system. The tribunals have also started to act as clones of regular courts
without possessing the basic characteristics of a court, which is to give
justice. We should abolish the tribunals and instead establish bodies
within the Services which will perform the dual function of ensuring
compliance with the code of conduct and protecting the Services from
arbitrariness.
There are certain key posts which must have a tenure, with no possibility
of lateral movement. This would include the Cabinet Secretary and the
Secretaries to government at the Centre. Such vital heads of departments
as Director, CBI, the Chief Secretaries, Directors General of Police and
PCCsF in the States and heads of key departments, including PWD,
Irrigation, PHE, Medical and Public Health, Agriculture must also enjoy a
tenure. There has to be system of selection to these key posts by a search
committee which has credibility and ordinarily only a person from the
approved panel should be appointed to the post. There must be a prescribed
tenure in which the upper age limit does not apply. During this period the
officer cannot be shifted, unless a departmental enquiry finds charges
proved against him after a formal charge sheet. There should also be a
provision for the officers holding posts such as those of Cabinet
Secretary, Chief Secretary, DGP, PCCF, Secretary to Government of India,
etc., not being eligible for any further appointments under government,
not even in a public sector undertaking, on retirement. An officer who can
no longer hope for further favors from government is more likely to be
independent than one who uses his post as stepping stone to higher things.
An independent head of department will be more protective of his
subordinates and tolerate much less political and administrative
interference in their work. In any case once the politicians find that
they cannot whimsically transfer key officers they would be less inclined
to dirty tricks in the administration.
Our system neither provides for reward for good work nor punishment for
bad. There is no fear of consequence in this country any more. This fear
has to be restored in the civil services, who must realize that failure of
performance, failure to work impartially, failure to give correct advice
and to stand by it, failure to maintain the highest standard of integrity
will all result in swift and drastic action up to and including dismissal
and prosecution. Simultaneously there has to be a system of rewards for
good work. There should be an independent evaluation group which would
determine how well an officer has performed and if it finds that an
officer has worked above and beyond the call of duty or turned in
performance of outstanding merit, he should be rewarded by being given a
cash incentive, public recognition or accelerated promotion. We have to
create a positive environment in which government servants look forward to
being rewarded because their good work is recognized.
Protection against arbitrariness, punishment of those who do not live up
to the highest standards of the service, rewards for good work, weeding
out of the worthless, continuous indoctrination and motivation for
improvement of the civil services and the agreement of parties to disagree
on details whilst agreeing on basics are all means by which we can restore
the rule of law and rebuild the civil services. This is both mete and
proper because a democracy needs efficient civil services which are honest
and have an élan.
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