Opinion
Israel's Disengagement
from
Gaza Strip:
Perils and Prospects
Israel is
preparing to ‘disengage’ from Gaza and four settlements in northern West
Bank in mid-August this year. About 8,500 Jewish settlers control 40 per
cent of Gaza, a 139-square-mile strip along the Mediterranean Sea that is
home to more than 1.3 million Palestinians. The departure of the settlers
will mean a new freedom for Gazans – from arduous checkpoints that have
for long restricted their movement. It means more than lifting physical
limits. The departure of the settlers offers a chance for Gazans to
reclaim property and establish a government that could form the foundation
of a future state. But this new independence comes with risks, including
potential factional fights to control Gaza as well as further isolation
from fellow Palestinians in the West Bank. Doubts have been raised over
whether the Palestinian Authority can run Gaza and prevent it from
becoming a sanctuary for militant groups targeting Israel. Many opponents
of the withdrawal say it would be a reward to Palestinian militants
fighting Israel.
The Gaza disengagement will be ‘successful’, especially in terms of having
a positive impact on the Israeli-Palestinian relationship and improvement
of Palestinian condition only if it leads to an end of occupation and
cessation of violence. As an exclusive step, divorced from meaningful
processes, would only escalate the conflict between the two peoples due to
both sides’ failed expectations. Several developments must take place.
To begin with,
the present ceasefire should persist and become more stable and more
comprehensive. This means that the Islamic militant groups must halt
attacks on Israel to preclude the latter’s ‘disproportionate’ retaliation
and ‘target killings’ of their leaders. They must also have a role in the
withdrawal process and political processes in its aftermath. The recent
round of violence between Palestinian militants and Israeli security
forces in Gaza Strip and West Bank, and the rounding up of 50 Islamic
Jihad activists by the IDF in the West Bank, has considerably strained the
restive four-month-old truce. Though President Mahmoud Abbas had earlier
reached an agreement with Islamic militants granting them a role in
preparations for the withdrawal, any further violence on their part would
force the Palestinian leader to adopt even tougher ‘preventive action’ to
address Israel’s lingering security concerns.
Further, the Jerusalem summit of June 21 meant to serve as an opportunity
for the two leaders to better coordinate security and economic
preparations for the Israeli withdrawal ended in gloom over issues such as
Abbas’ efforts to confront Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and the release of
additional prisoners from Israeli jails. Agreement on those issues could
have taken the talks further into evolving a list of operational
activities, essential for an orderly and coherent handover of the vacated
areas. Abbas accused Sharon of weakening him politically by failing to
fulfill agreements (release of political prisoners, withdrawal from West
Bank towns under Palestinian Authority before the Al-Aqsa intifada, and
halting of settlement activity in the West Bank) or ease security measures
that complicate the life of many Palestinians. Sharon, meanwhile, said
fulfilling those agreements depended upon Abbas’ progress in fighting and
disarming militant groups that the Israeli leader said, he believed, also
posed a long-term threat to the Palestinian government.
This acrimony is made even more acerbic in the absence of a description of
the geographic scope of withdrawal from the Israeli side. Under discussion
still is the military presence on the 10-km Philadelphi Route between the
Gaza Strip and Egypt – described by one Israeli commentator as being ‘as
porous as Swiss cheese’ – which some fear will become a conduit for arms
smugglers. The Israeli Cabinet’s resolution on the disengagement says the
narrow Philadelphi Route is an ‘essential security requirement’, and
Sharon has hinted against Palestinian wishes that Israeli soldiers will
remain there if Israel is dissatisfied with Egyptian and Palestinian
border security. The recent spate of violence only bolsters Israeli claim
that the Palestinian Authority security organs are not in real control and
are not capable of operating effectively against the various armed
factions. In such a scenario, the Israeli security forces are likely to
continue their operations in the Palestinian areas.
Both the sides are also divided over the issue of the reopening of the
Gaza airport closed since December 2001, when Israeli jets bombed the
radar center and pile drivers ripped up the runway in retaliation for the
Palestinian uprising that began in September 2000. Palestinians view the
building of an airport as a key to the future of the local economy after
the pullout whereas Israel believes that such an act would endanger its
security. Palestinian forces will be in charge on the ground, but Israel
will continue to control the perimeter of the Strip and Gaza airspace, as
well as patrolling the Gaza coast.
Thus the withdrawal from Gaza Strip is wrought with numerous perils.
Israeli troops will continue to control movement into and out of the
territory. They also will stay along Gaza’s southern border until Israeli
officials are convinced Egypt is serious about stopping arms smuggling
there. The territory has no airport. Israel also destroyed early work on a
seaport. The IDF will continue to deploy along the border between Egypt
and the Gaza Strip, and this will cause continuous friction with
Palestinian population living nearby. It will be difficult to normalize
the movement of goods and people as long as Israel continues to retain
control of the outer envelope of the Gaza Strip and there is no real
change in the West Bank other than removal of four settlements. And the
instability of the ceasefire will also not allow Israel to substantially
ease restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement.
Without knowing where any border will lie, it is impossible to coordinate
what kind of border regime will be in place and what restrictions on the
movement of goods and people Israel has in mind. This is especially
important because most of the industrial and agricultural assets that
Israel might leave in the settlements are intended to produce goods for
export. Not knowing what kind of border regime will regulate the movement
of products from Gaza to the outside world through Israel very negatively
affects Palestinian preparations for post-disengagement. Palestinian
Foreign minister Naser Al-Qidwa says that potential investors are doubtful
because they’re not sure of Israel’s intentions. “Is (the disengagement)
the beginning of something good with regard to the whole occupied
territory and the peace between the two sides, or is this an attempt on
the Israeli side to get rid of a burden that is suffocating this area?” he
commented.
International financial assistance is a necessary condition for a
Palestinian economic revival, but also for rebuilding the capabilities and
institutions of the Palestinian Authority after the destruction they
endured during the intifada. It is especially important to reform the
security services, decrease the number of competing services, and create
unity of command. The international calendar is focused in part on fixing
a donors’ conference to pledge support to the Palestinian Authority
pursuant to progress on World Bank and Ad Hoc Liaison Committee
recommendations. The economy of Gaza is not viable on its own, it is only
viable as part of the overall Palestinian economy. In this context, it is
essential that Israel permit the establishment of a seaport in Gaza and
the reopening of the airport, to create an environment that might attract
some investment and thus create jobs and ensure at least the minimum level
of economic and consequently political stability.
Nearly two-thirds of Gaza’s Arab population lives below the poverty line,
according to the International Labor Organization. With the extra farmland
and the removal of restrictions placed on them by the Israeli occupation,
many will be optimistic about an improvement in their quality of life. A
crucial factor in the development of Gaza will be its links with
Palestinian territory in the West Bank, and the outside world. According
to the landmark 1993 Oslo peace deal, Israel must ensure a ‘safe passage’
between the two territories that is subject to Palestinian control. Two
leading plans currently call for the construction of a sunken road between
the two zones, and a railway, could be expeditiously embarked upon.
The two sides also have divergent positions on the post-disengagement
political process. Mahmoud Abbas wishes to skip the second interim stage
of the roadmap, namely the establishment of a Palestinian state with
provisional borders, while Israeli PM Ariel Sharon insists on another
interim stage and refuses to enter negotiations on a permanent status
agreement. This divergence of positions most crucially causes the two
parties to refrain from real cooperation and coordination on
implementation of the disengagement plan. The Palestinian Authority line
on this issue is both hot and cold: it has welcomed the disengagement as
‘the beginning of the implementation of the roadmap leading to an
independent Palestinian state’, but equally it is ‘a blueprint for
Sharon’s vision of an emasculated Palestinian state’. The Palestinian
leadership has said clearly that Israel will not be given any political
concessions as a result of the disengagement, while many Palestinians fear
the disengagement is a smokescreen, giving Israel more time to tighten its
grip on occupied East Jerusalem and its settlements in the West Bank.
Israel and the US have insisted that the disengagement from Gaza will not
replace progress on the US-sponsored roadmap for peace in the region. The
entire disengagement process will ultimately be judged from the point of
view of Gaza’s Palestinian population; the disengagement itself is a
successful step towards regaining complete control of their land after
decades of occupation. From the Israeli point of view, the success of
Sharon’s plan, proposed independently of the US-sponsored roadmap, will be
judged by whether it causes a drop in the number of people killed in
violence in the region, not just in and around Gaza, but throughout Israel
and also the West Bank. If, however, attacks launched from Gaza on Israeli
targets continue, or suspicion grows that militant groups such as Hamas or
Islamic Jihad are being allowed to rearm in the Gaza Strip, the plan may
be viewed as a risk that the Israeli premier should not have taken. If,
however, the plan is successful in reducing deaths in the conflict and
increasing trust between the two sides, its long-term impact could be
immeasurable.
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