Opinion
Post-election, Kiyani Likely to Emerge Stronger in Pakistan
by Wilson John
The Pakistan
Army has never faced such multiple challenges, all equally daunting, to
its image, credibility, doctrine, and its omnipresence in Pakistani
society. For most of the country's 60 years of existence, the army has,
by and large, remained a final arbiter of its destiny. Today, it faces
the dilemma of change triggered by events largely of its own making,
particularly that of its previous chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.
The problem was not in Musharraf's courage, determination and intention
to put his country on the global map as a progressive Muslim country.
Vision and humility were not his forte. He was trapped between two
stools - the chief of the army staff and a personal vision of a 'saviour'.
It was not surprising that he blundered miserably along the way,
meddling heavily in politics, gambling with jihadis and playing poker
with Washington, dragging the army and Pakistan in the process, on a
path of self-destruction.
Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani can resolve Musharraf's (and
Pakistan's) dilemma. Kiyani has never been in the charmed circle of
Musharraf. He was a rank outsider who moved in close to the boss by a
quirk of fate and a generous push from Washington. Kiyani by any stretch
of imagination is not a political novice; he was deputy military
secretary to Benazir Bhutto during her first stint as prime minister; he
was involved in negotiating a political pact with Benazir on behalf of
Musharraf and, way back as general officer commanding the Rawalpindi
Corps, was involved in running the political dispensation in
Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
No one, perhaps, is acutely conscious of the realisation that the
Pakistan Army today faces a serious credibility crisis, perhaps graver
than what it had endured after the ignominious surrender of honour, and
territory, in 1971. Kiyani who was a young second lieutenant during the
short war with India should be acutely aware of this public perception
about the army. It was, therefore, not surprising that at the first
opportunity, he minced no words in warning his corps commanders to steer
away from politics.
At his first corps commanders' conference in early January, he told his
senior officials, many of whom were Musharraf's appointees and
confidants, to shun politics and concentrate on professional
responsibilities. His declaration of 2008 as the Year of Soldier was not
merely ceremonial; it was a clear signal of his thinking and divergence
with his predecessor's style of functioning. To emphasise that he meant
business, within days of the conference, Kiyani wrote a formal letter to
his senior officers laying down the rules of the game in black and
white. He said no officer should meet a political leader without his
permission. Nor should any politician be invited to Army Headquarters in
Rawalpindi. President Musharraf fell firmly within the prohibited list,
an army spokesman clarified within days of the directives. This has the
potential of creating a peculiar situation within the top hierarchy.
At least six key positions - the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff
committee, the director general of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),
the director general of military intelligence, the chief of staff at
General Headquarters (GHQ), the director general of the strategic forces
command and the commander of 111 Brigade - are held by Musharraf's
loyalists and appointees and it would be but natural for them to keep
their previous boss in the loop which was bound to cause serious issues
of propriety sooner than later. Kiyani's only option would be to
reshuffle these appointments to avoid a possible collapse of the chain
of command.
Even so, like any other ex-general, Musharraf is bound to find himself
excluded from the Rawalpindi GHQ in the months to come. Kiyani's order
to shift the army's communication equipment from Army House in
Rawalpindi to his residence leaves no doubt how the axis of power has
shifted in Islamabad.
It is quite possible that Kiyani might upset Musharraf's political
calculations in the just concluded elections. Kiyani would also need a
political dispensation that is more amenable to the GHQ than the
President House. This is critical for the army to restore its hold over
the Nuclear Command Authority that Musharraf, soon after he doffed his
uniform, usurped for the president with a constitution amendment.
Kiyani has thus indicated his line of thinking in no unclear terms in
the first two months of takeover and it would not be surprising to
witness a silent coup in the next few months with Kiyani re-asserting
himself as head of the most powerful institution in Pakistan. It just
might restore a sense of stability in the army, and in Pakistan.
(Wilson John is a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. He
can be contacted at wjohn60@gmail.com)
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