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PlainSpeak
United States - India Strategic Partnership Reviewed
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
October 23, 2005
In the 21st century the
global power balance and peace and stability would be greatly
determined by the inter-play of strategic and political equations
between the United States, Russia. China, and India.
The United States and Russia
have been Cold War adversaries. The United States and China have fought
a direct war in Korea in the 1950s and a proxy war in Vietnam in the
1960s and 1970s.The present relations of the United States with Russia
and China, even after a decade and a half into the post-Cold War era can
at best be termed as adversarial if not hostile, despite the rhetoric.
India as the fourth key global player of the 21st century was spurned
and frowned upon by the United States during the Cold War. This was due
to United States dislike of India's independent foreign policy stances
which at many a time were not convergent with the US strategic agenda.
India began to be noticed and factored in US strategic calculus only in
the latter half of the last decade of the 20th century. It was due to
the burgeoning unfolding of India's military and economic potential.
India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998 was the defining moment of India's
power assertion . At the turn of the millennium in the last year of the
second Clinton Administration the US and India seriously sat down to
transform to transform US-India relations into a strategic partnership.
In 2005 under the second Bush Administration and another Government of a
different political dispensation in India the transformation was
cemented by two agreements, namely (1)The Defense Framework Agreement,
June 28, 2005 and (2)Joint Statement of the US-India Summit, July 18,
2005, which provided for a comprehensive transformation of US-India
relationship by cooperation in the fields of civilian nuclear energy,
dual-use technology, space and commerce. The centrepiece of this Summit
Meeting was the US commitment to help India gain access to civilian
nuclear energy requirements by getting the US Congress to amend
regulations and likewise by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India in
return had to provide certain reciprocal measures and guarantees in the
nuclear field. India was recognized as a de-facto nuclear weapons power
and as a responsible one, too.
This was a historic development and was intended to pave the way for a
more substantive strategic partnership for the future.
Analytically, what needs to be recognized in both countries is, that:
1. The agreements are a
product of a bi-partisan political support in both countries.
2. They span two different political dispensations in both countries.
3. The intention on both sides was to secure their respective national
security interests by seeking convergent strategic interests
In the United States domestic
debate for those opposing the deal, the following needs to be
recognized:
1. India has not signed a
"military alliance" agreement. What it has signed are agreements of
cooperation in the fields of civilian nuclear energy, defense, space,
dual-use technology and commerce.
2. India by doing so has not bartered away its strategic autonomy or the
right to define its national strategic agenda.
While the opposition in India
has been muted and confined basically to the Leftist Parties, the
opposition in USA is spanning an important and wide spectrum
encompassing the US Congress, the nonproliferation lobbies in Washington
and what can at best be termed as remnants of the "Cold War Warriors" in
the US Establishment. The last named two are taken by India in its
stride as a natural out come in any democracy, including India. However,
what is disconcerting for Indians, if not for the Indian Government, are
the discordant voices in the US Congress.
Indians have a high regard for the Honorable Members of the US Congress
and also believe that they have a good grasp of international strategic
realities and what best secures United States national security
interests. Indians expect that a higher standard of visionary debate
takes place in the Congress and not a low-down one to serve narrow
vested interests or lobbies traditionally opposing India.
The intemperate statements of Rep Tim Lantos stating that India has to
vote with USA to isolate Iran and that how India votes could make or
break the July 18 Indo-US nuclear deal smacks of imperial haughtiness,
political blackmail and a lack of grasp of strategic realities. It also
betrays an attempt to define India's strategic agenda. None of this is
acceptable to Indians at large.
To the discordant voices in the US Congress a central message that needs
to be given is that so far they have only dealt with nations in equal
potential to USA, only as adversaries, namely Russia and China. There
they could adopt confrontational and combative approaches without
bothering for the others sensitivities. For the first time in their
history they will be now dealing with a friendly global power in the
making. The US Congress has to reorient itself to adapt to this new
equation. Confrontational attitudes and political blackmail need to be
replaced with a sophisticated respect for India's sensitivities both
strategic and political.
India cannot dictate the above but hopes the negative voices in the US
Congress does not translate into Indian public opinion to pressurize
their Government, as a consequence, to veer away towards other strategic
constellations.
India has averaged a sustained economic growth rate of 7-8% without
substantial civilian nuclear energy power generation. An approval by the
US Congress of the July 18 commitment of the US President could
accelerate this growth. A non-approval would not impede India's growth;
however it could negatively impact on Indians at large , if not the
Indian Government. India's foreign policy issues are increasingly
intruding into India's domestic political debate.
India would be looking forward to President Bush's visit to India in
February 2006. It is fervently hoped that to make the visit as a
historical transformation of USA-India relations he comes armed with the
Congressional approval for the July18 nuclear deal; alternatively, he
exercises his prerogative for a "Presidential Waiver in US National
Security Interests” in the pursuance of his vision.
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PlainSpeak
The Week of October 23, 2005
United States-India Strategic
Partnership Reviewed
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
The New York Times on a Roll
by Gaurang Bhatt, MD
Cikhandi Syndrome by J. Ajithkumar
The Law: Congealed Colonialism
by Arvind Narrain
Putting Off Pregnancy
by Nitin Jugran Bahuguna
A Beautiful Brown, at What Cost?
by Naunidhi Kaur
Natural
Calamities and Vastu
by Niranjan Babu Bangalore and
Raman Suprajarama
The Tearful Jerks by Soma
Guru
Claiming the Top Spot for Women
by Sudeshna Sarkar
The Witty Side - A weekly column by
Melvin Durai
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