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Pakistan Decides
to Impeach Musharraf: Implications
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
Pakistan’s decision to
impeach General Musharraf from the self-assumed position of President of
Pakistan was inevitable as has been the fate of all military dictators.
General Musharraf had outlived his strategic utility to the United
States and a denouement had set in as was reflected in my Column of July
6 2008 entitled “United States Denouement With Pakistan”. After nine
years of military rule by General Musharraf, the strategic, military,
political and economic situation is in a dismal mess as was surveyed in
my Column of July 20 2008 entitled “Pakistan Internally and Externally
Besieged”. So there is no surprise that Musharraf has lost both external
and internal support for his continuance in power in Pakistan.
The political decision to initiate impeachment proceedings was announced
jointly on August 7 2008 by the leaders of the Federal Coalition, Asif
Ali Zardari and Former Prime Minster Nawaz Sharif. It has taken them
nearly six months of torturous negotiations to achieve a consensus. In
Pakistan doubts still exist whether this is just a media exercise and
Zardari may eventually soft-pedal the proceedings.
Pakistan today stands at critical political cross-roads as whatever be
the final outcome of the impeachment proceedings politically things
cannot be the same. The implications are many extending from the future
course of Pak-USA relations, Pakistan Army’s reactions to Musharraf’s
impeachment, Pakistan Army’s future attitude to civil-military relations
and political cohesion within the Pakistan polity.
United States had become weary of General Musharraf’s continuous
commitments to fully support the American global war on terror and rein
in the Taliban from destabilizing Afghanistan from their sanctuaries in
Pakistan without delivering on his promises. The United States was also
becoming chary of giving unqualified support to General Musharraf in
view of his fast declining domestic support within Pakistan and a
consequent adverse impact on the overall image of USA in Pakistan.
The United States official response on the announcement of the
impeachment of the President has been that it is the internal matter of
Pakistan implying that
- USA would not be averse to the political
exit of General Musharraf
- Also indicative is the fact that the
United States would have already discussed this with the Pakistan Army
Chief and political leaders that the impeachment could go ahead and that
USA would not intervene or intercede on Musharraf’s behalf
- USA would
have worked out alternative plans for the post-Musharraf phase.
It was for nothing that there was a flurry of senior US Administration
officials to Pakistan in the last three months.
Pakistan Army’s reactions to Musharraf’s impeachment are being
interpreted in Pakistan in opposite ways. One view is that the Pakistan
Army would not take kindly to the humiliation of its former Army Chief.
The second view is that General Kayani would not like the Army to get
into a confrontation with Pakistani politicians in view of the fact that
the departure of Musharraf is a popular demand across all sections of
Pakistan’s society. Also it would be impossible to ignore that the
people of Pakistan are no longer in a mood to tolerate military
intervention in political affairs especially when in the instant case
the crisis in Pakistan centers on an individual and not on any threat to
Pakistan’ security.
This juncture is critical for the Pakistan Army in relation to the
future of civil-military relations. If the Pakistan Army intervenes on
behalf of Musharraf by providing him back-up support to dismiss the
Assemblies then the Pakistan Army’s future image would be one of a
‘rogue army’ with the Pakistani masses. Should it however adopt a
neutral attitude on Musharraf’s impeachment while it may win
appreciation from the Pakistani public it runs the risk of conveying
that it is now amenable to civilian political control.
Political cohesion amongst Pakistan’s political parties is a feature
which has been sadly lacking within Pakistan. If however in this instant
case both the PPP and PML(N) set a record of unity to impeach General
Musharraf, the first foundations of political maturity would have
appeared in Pakistan. But then this is a big ‘if’ till the successful
ouster of Musharraf.
General Musharraf has only two options to forestall his impeachment. The
first is to get the Pakistan Army Corps Commanders to stand by him in
dissolving the Assemblies. The second option is to drive a wedge in
Pakistan’s polity and politically frustrate the impeachment process. The
General can be expected to feverishly try to exploit both options.
Most Pakistanis feverishly hope that General Musharraf would gracefully
bow out on his own to spare Pakistan another round of political
turbulence, but would he?
August 10,
2008
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