Latin American politics appears to be undergoing another major shift in direction. Unlike the “Pink Tide” of left-wing politics that attracted global attention two decades ago, political forces leaning towards the right wing are now emerging one after another, from Argentina to El Salvador, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Peru. Analysts such as Pablo Meriguet view this development not simply as an electoral change, but as the result of a combination of neoliberal economic policies, social inequality, the weakening of workers’ rights, American influence, and the political failures of the left.

But one key question needs to be understood here. Are the people of Latin America really and voluntarily accepting right-wing ideology? Or are they voting for right-wing candidates as an alternative because they are frustrated with insecurity, inflation, unemployment, corruption, migration and failures of governance? Or are there other reasons as well? These issues need to be studied comprehensively. Recent international media analyses tend to support the second explanation. Although the “right-wing shift” is real, understanding the public mood behind it simply as ideological support for the right wing would be an oversimplification of the political reality. Americas Quarterly has also suggested that anti-incumbency voting is playing an important role in this development.

Crime, violence, drug cartels, extortion and public security have become major election issues in Latin American politics, and this has been one of the most important reasons for the rise of the right wing. According to an analysis published by the American Associated Press in June 2026, the average homicide rate in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025 declined by more than five percent compared with 2024. However, violence increased sharply in countries such as Peru, Colombia and Ecuador. This contradictory situation has created an opportunity for right-wing populist leaders to politically exploit people’s fear about security.

El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele has become a symbol of this political model. Strict police and military actions, mass arrests and a policy of “zero tolerance” towards crime appear attractive to people who want immediate results. Solutions proposed by the left wing, such as police reforms, strengthening the judicial system and social programmes, may take years to produce results. But voters living in fear of crime are saying, “We need security today, not tomorrow.” The right wing is successfully taking advantage of this political mindset.

However, this is also where a dangerous turn for democracy can begin. The people’s legitimate desire to control crime should not become acceptance of the concentration of power that weakens democratic institutions. Tough governance and effective governance are not the same thing. If legal rights, civil liberties, media freedom and the independence of the judiciary are weakened in the name of immediate security, another kind of political crisis may emerge in the name of fighting crime. International media have also pointed to the danger that the Bukele model could place pressure on human rights and democracy.

The rise of Javier Milei in Argentina is another important example of this change. Inflation, economic crisis, dissatisfaction with government spending and frustration with traditional political parties together created space for Milei’s strongly market-oriented politics. Meriguet strongly criticizes the Milei government from the perspective of workers’ rights, the welfare system and neoliberal reforms. He also documented the protests against labour reforms in Argentina in late 2025. But from another perspective, the support received by Milei cannot be seen simply as support for traditional right-wing ideology. It was also a protest vote against the political system, driven by people’s frustration with decades of economic instability.

The victory of José Antonio Kast in Chile made the shift towards the right wing even more visible. Kast won 58 percent of the vote in the 2025 presidential election. He made crime, migration and border control major themes of his campaign. Reuters described this as Chile’s clearest political shift to the right since the end of the military dictatorship in 1990. The New Yorker also analysed Kast’s victory as another important addition to the growing group of right-wing leaders across Latin America.

The developments in Colombia now provide another strong indication of this regional political change. Following the left-wing leadership of Gustavo Petro, the victory of Abelardo de la Espriella has moved Colombia towards the right wing as well. His political message has focused mainly on tough security policies, military action, the elimination of drug trafficking and market-oriented policies. The support of U.S. President Donald Trump also gave political strength to his campaign. With his assumption of office on August 7, the group of right-wing governments in Latin America became further strengthened.

However, it would also be premature to say that Latin America as a whole has become a “right-wing continent.” In large countries such as Mexico and Brazil, left-wing or centre-left political forces remain strong. The victory of Yamandú Orsi in Uruguay in 2024 also shows that the right-wing wave is not an unstoppable, one-way political transformation. Therefore, what is happening now may be better understood as a cycle of changes in government driven by public dissatisfaction, particularly in the context of American pressure, rather than as a complete ideological revolution.

Here, the main warning in Pablo Meriguet’s analysis cannot be ignored. He argues that neoliberalism is once again becoming stronger in Latin America and that right-wing governments, under the influence of the International Monetary Fund and the United States, are attempting to change government structures and labour relations. At the same time, the left wing also needs serious self-examination. Without creating a strong political alternative on issues such as poverty, inequality, public services, workers’ rights and democratic participation, simply warning people about the “danger of the right wing” will not bring them back to the left.

This is the real essence of Latin American politics. People do not remain permanently on the left or on the right. They move towards the form of government that they believe can bring change to their lives. If the left fails in government, the right comes to power. Likewise, if the right fails to solve people’s problems, people will once again look for an alternative. Therefore, the current shift towards the right should not be declared the final defeat of the left. But it must certainly be seen as a serious warning to the left.

The people of Latin America are not asking an ideological question. They are asking practical questions: “Who will provide security for my family? Who will control prices? Who will provide employment? Who will control corruption? Who will protect my democratic rights?” The political force that can provide credible answers to these questions will have the future. Therefore, the shift of Latin America towards the right should not be firmly presented as the final destination of its politics. It should be viewed only as another political phase arising from public dissatisfaction. If the left fails to understand this, it will repeat its own history. At the same time, if the right assumes that people’s frustration will give it permanent power, those same people may pass judgment on it tomorrow as well.