A Platform for Cooperation, Not Confrontation

The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12 and 13, 2026, comes at a defining moment for a grouping that has changed considerably since its inception two decades ago. With 11 members now on board and India assuming the chairmanship, BRICS represents a substantially larger share of the global population and economy than it did when it began. Yet its growing size also brings a difficult question to the fore: can BRICS emerge as a meaningful platform for cooperation without turning itself into an instrument of geopolitical confrontation with the United States and the West?

India's answer to this question will matter. New Delhi has consistently sought strategic autonomy rather than alignment with any single power bloc. Its expanding economic, technological and defence partnerships with the United States, Europe and Japan coexist with its longstanding strategic relationship with Russia and continued energy purchases from Moscow. India's diplomatic credibility rests, in considerable measure, on its ability to maintain these multiple relationships without allowing one to become hostage to another. The BRICS presidency offers an opportunity to demonstrate precisely this principle.

The grouping today consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Collectively, BRICS members account for roughly half of the world's population, around 40% of global GDP and about a quarter of global trade. These figures give the grouping considerable economic weight. But economic weight alone does not make a coherent geopolitical bloc. The interests of its members remain diverse, and in several cases sharply divergent.

That diversity is both BRICS's weakness and its potential strength. Russia and Iran have deeply adversarial relations with the West. China and India remain strategic competitors despite efforts to stabilise their bilateral relationship. The Arab members have their own regional priorities, while Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia and the African members bring different development concerns to the table. Disagreements within the grouping over regional conflicts and geopolitical questions have already demonstrated the limits of political consensus.

The absence of a common geopolitical position, however, should not be treated as a failure. It could instead encourage BRICS to concentrate on the areas where cooperation is both possible and necessary. India's stated emphasis on resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability provides a useful framework. Trade, energy security, food security, healthcare, climate change, digital technologies and resilient supply chains are issues on which the developing world has much to gain from closer coordination.

The real test will be whether BRICS can translate its considerable economic weight into practical outcomes. The developing economies represented in the grouping face common problems: expensive capital, unequal access to technology, vulnerable supply chains, energy insecurity, food-price volatility and inadequate representation in several global institutions. These are challenges that cannot be resolved through anti-Western rhetoric. They require sustained institutional cooperation.

India has particular strengths that it can bring to this agenda. Its experience with digital public infrastructure, especially the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), offers possibilities for wider cooperation in digital payments and cross-border transactions. Greater connectivity between payment systems, where technically and politically feasible, could facilitate trade and reduce transaction costs. Similarly, stronger cooperation in manufacturing, technology, skills and healthcare could help BRICS countries build more resilient economies.

The grouping also offers India a wider economic gateway. Stronger links with African and other emerging markets could create opportunities for Indian manufacturers, technology companies, service providers and skilled professionals. BRICS can therefore become more than a diplomatic forum; it can contribute to the diversification of India's trade and investment relationships.

But there is a danger in treating BRICS as the institutional expression of an emerging anti-Western order. Such an approach would undermine the very diversity that gives the grouping its relevance. Most BRICS economies remain deeply integrated with Western markets, financial systems and technological ecosystems. Their economic interests cannot be neatly divided into opposing camps. Nor would the interests of developing countries necessarily be served by replacing one form of dependence with another.

The more compelling case for BRICS is therefore not that it should create a rival to the existing international order, but that it should help reform that order. Calls for greater representation for developing economies in institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization are legitimate. So too are demands for a fairer international financial architecture. But reform carries greater credibility when it is pursued through negotiation and institution-building rather than confrontation.

For India, this distinction is particularly important. New Delhi's influence derives not from its ability to choose one camp over another, but from its capacity to engage multiple centres of power simultaneously. A successful BRICS presidency should reflect that diplomatic tradition. India should encourage consensus on economic and developmental issues while resisting pressure to turn the grouping into a political alliance against the West.

The success of the New Delhi summit should therefore not be measured by the sharpness of its rhetoric against Washington or European capitals. It should be measured by what BRICS can deliver to its own citizens: greater trade, better connectivity, stronger energy and food security, technological cooperation, more resilient supply chains and a greater voice for developing countries in global governance.

A multipolar world does need institutions that reflect the changing distribution of economic power. BRICS can contribute to that transition. But multipolarity need not mean confrontation, and strategic autonomy need not mean strategic hostility. India's challenge — and its opportunity — is to ensure that BRICS becomes a bridge between competing centres of power rather than another wall dividing them.

BRICS will have greater international legitimacy if it demonstrates that cooperation among emerging economies can coexist with constructive engagement with the West. A grouping that builds bridges, strengthens institutions and advances development will have a far more enduring impact than one defined primarily by whom it opposes. For India, that should be the central message of BRICS 2026.