India and Indonesia

India and Indonesia are entering a new phase in their bilateral relationship. What was once largely shaped by historical, cultural and civilisational links is increasingly acquiring a strategic dimension. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s engagement with President Prabowo Subianto, expanding defence cooperation, discussions on critical minerals and maritime security, and the renewed focus on connectivity have all contributed to this shift. Prabowo’s presence at the BRICS Summit in New Delhi further underlines Indonesia’s growing importance in India’s foreign policy. Yet the relationship must be judged not by diplomatic symbolism, but by the substance of what follows.

Geography is perhaps the strongest foundation for this partnership. Indonesia occupies a critical position at the intersection of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, while India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands provide a natural strategic link with Southeast Asia. The proposed development and greater utilisation of Sabang port, therefore, has significance well beyond commercial connectivity. Cooperation in maritime surveillance, freedom of navigation, disaster response, fisheries and protection of vital sea lanes could give the relationship a durable strategic foundation.

This maritime dimension is particularly important as the Indo-Pacific becomes increasingly contested. India and Indonesia have both expressed support for a free, open and rules-based maritime order. But neither country is interested in being absorbed into a rigid military bloc. Indonesia has traditionally pursued an independent foreign policy and maintains extensive relations with China, the United States, Japan and other major powers. India, too, has emphasised strategic autonomy. Their partnership will be stronger if it is based on shared interests rather than an exaggerated perception of a common adversary.

Defence cooperation offers significant possibilities. The BrahMos partnership represents an important opportunity for India to demonstrate that its defence-industrial ambitions can generate credible exports and long-term security partnerships. For Indonesia, cooperation with India can diversify its sources of defence technology. But defence ties should extend beyond weapons sales to joint production, maintenance, training, maritime-domain awareness and research. Such cooperation would create greater institutional depth than a single procurement agreement.

The economic relationship remains the weakest link. Bilateral trade has expanded considerably, but the imbalance remains heavily tilted in Indonesia’s favour. India imports large quantities of coal, palm oil, minerals and other commodities, while Indian exports to Indonesia remain comparatively modest. This imbalance cannot be ignored if the two countries want to build a genuinely resilient economic partnership. India needs greater market access for pharmaceuticals, automobiles, engineering goods, digital services, machinery and processed agricultural products.

Critical minerals provide a particularly promising area for cooperation. The global transition towards electric vehicles, renewable energy and advanced electronics is increasing demand for minerals essential to modern industries. Indonesia’s resource base and India’s expanding manufacturing ambitions could complement each other. Joint ventures, technology partnerships and reliable supply chains could transform the relationship from one based largely on commodity trade into one based on value creation.

The China factor will inevitably remain part of the strategic conversation, but it should not become the organising principle of India-Indonesia relations. Indonesia does not want to choose between major powers, and India should not expect it to do so. A mature partnership would recognise this strategic autonomy and build cooperation around maritime security, economic resilience, connectivity and regional stability.

The larger opportunity lies in linking India’s Act East policy with Indonesia’s central role in ASEAN and the wider Indo-Pacific. Greater connectivity between South Asia and Southeast Asia can strengthen trade routes, tourism, education, technology exchanges and supply chains. India should therefore look beyond high-level summits and create mechanisms that bring businesses, universities, ports, defence institutions and technology companies into the relationship.

The India-Indonesia partnership has the ingredients of a significant Asian strategic relationship. But potential is not achievement. The success of the partnership will ultimately depend on whether announcements become projects, defence cooperation becomes industrial collaboration, trade becomes more balanced and maritime cooperation produces tangible regional security.

The relationship has moved beyond symbolism. The next challenge is to give it substance. For both India and Indonesia, the opportunity is too important to be reduced to summit diplomacy. It must become a sustained partnership anchored in geography, economic complementarity and strategic autonomy.