The Case for Judicial Reform

The Constitution is the bedrock of Indian democracy, and the Supreme Court occupies a pivotal position in safeguarding its principles. Its foremost responsibilities include checking the arbitrary exercise of executive power, protecting citizens’ fundamental rights and upholding constitutional morality. Y

et, the country’s highest judicial institution is increasingly weighed down by an enormous backlog of cases. An institution entrusted with delivering timely justice is itself struggling to overcome mounting delays. Against this backdrop, the proposal to reorganise the Supreme Court into two distinct functional divisions deserves serious consideration.

The challenge confronting the Supreme Court in 2026 is not merely a shortage of judges. It also reflects structural deficiencies in the classification of cases, judicial procedures and the distribution of responsibilities. The apex court, which should devote its time and attention to significant constitutional questions, is compelled to spend a considerable part of its judicial capacity hearing routine appeals. Consequently, proceedings before Constitution Benches are frequently delayed. The fact that questions with far-reaching implications for Indian democracy sometimes remain unresolved for years is deeply troubling.

The Law Commission’s 229th Report, submitted in 2009, offered a practical solution. It recommended the establishment of a Constitution Bench in Delhi and regional appellate benches in different parts of the country, including Chennai or Hyderabad, Kolkata and Mumbai. Such an arrangement would spare litigants from southern, eastern and western India the considerable expense and inconvenience of travelling to Delhi for every appeal. It would reduce litigation costs, save valuable time and make the highest level of justice more accessible. More importantly, regional benches could handle ordinary appeals, enabling the Constitution Bench in Delhi to concentrate on questions of constitutional interpretation and matters of national importance. A Parliamentary Standing Committee reiterated its support for regional benches in 2023. Despite the apparent acceptance of the proposal in principle, its implementation remains disappointingly elusive.

Experiences from other democracies offer useful lessons. The United States has a system of specialised federal appellate circuit courts. South Africa maintains separate Constitutional and Supreme Courts of Appeal, while Germany has an independent Federal Constitutional Court to adjudicate constitutional disputes. Although these institutional arrangements cannot be transplanted wholesale into India, they demonstrate that a rational division of judicial responsibilities can improve efficiency without compromising the authority of the highest judicial institutions.

Opponents of the proposal argue that regional benches could undermine the institutional unity of the Supreme Court and produce conflicting judgments. This concern cannot be dismissed lightly. A common and authoritative interpretation of the Constitution is indispensable to the country's judicial coherence. However, the answer lies not in rejecting reform but in designing appropriate safeguards. Constitutional interpretation, fundamental rights, Centre-State relations and questions concerning federalism must remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitution Bench in Delhi. Regional benches should primarily deal with ordinary appeals. A clearly defined mechanism must also be established to resolve conflicting judicial opinions, with the Chief Justice of India providing institutional coordination.

The mounting backlog underlines the urgency of reform. According to figures submitted by the Union Law Ministry to Parliament, 95,954 cases were pending before the Supreme Court as of July 30, 2026. Of these, 9,425 had remained unresolved for more than a decade, while 14,352 had been pending for over five years. Against a sanctioned strength of 34 judges, the court had 33 serving judges as of February 11, 2026. These figures make it evident that merely increasing the number of judges will not adequately address the problem. The admission of cases, prioritisation of hearings, allocation of judicial benches and timely delivery of judgments all require substantial reform.

Reorganising the Supreme Court should not be mistaken for diluting its constitutional authority. The objective must be to bring justice closer to citizens while enabling the apex court to discharge its fundamental responsibilities more effectively. Article 130 of the Constitution provides for the Supreme Court to sit outside Delhi, subject to the approval of the President and consultation with the Chief Justice of India. This constitutional provision offers scope for examining the feasibility of regional benches and initiating the necessary administrative and legislative measures.

Justice delayed must not become justice denied. Public confidence in the judiciary rests not on the grandeur of its buildings or the stature of its judges, but on its ability to deliver justice within a reasonable time. India must preserve the institutional unity of its Supreme Court while distributing its workload more rationally. Delaying reform will only deepen the backlog and distance ordinary citizens from justice. A wider national debate, free from partisan considerations, is therefore imperative. Strengthening the judiciary does not mean concentrating an ever-increasing burden on a single institution; it means expanding the avenues through which every citizen can access justice.