What Indira Gandhi & Narendra Modi Teach us about ‘Putting India First’

When wars erupt in West Asia, should India choose sides or choose itself? Should foreign policy be guided by ideological solidarity or by national interest? Can friendship guarantee energy security? Or, in the harsh world of geopolitics, must every nation become the guardian of its own destiny?

History has an uncanny way of repeating itself, albeit in different forms.

In 1973, war broke out between Israel and a coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria. The conflict triggered the first global oil crisis and sent shockwaves through the world economy.

More than five decades later, another conflict engulfed West Asia, this time involving Iran, Israel, and the United States. Once again, oil markets trembled, shipping routes came under threat, and the world feared another energy crisis.

For India, both moments posed the same fundamental question: How does an energy-dependent nation protect itself when the world's oil-producing regions are on fire?

The answer given by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1973 and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2025-26 reveals not merely two different foreign policy approaches but two entirely different philosophies of statecraft.

One relied on political goodwill.

The other relied on strategic preparedness.

One expected concessions.

The other prepared for disruptions.

The difference between the two approaches marks the evolution of India's foreign policy from idealism to realism, from dependence to resilience, and from sentiment to strategic autonomy.

The 1973 Oil Shock: When Political Friendship Met Economic Reality

In October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel in what became known as the Yom Kippur War. In response to Western support for Israel, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries imposed an oil embargo and drastically reduced production.

The consequences were devastating.

Global crude oil prices rose from approximately US$3 per barrel to nearly US$12 per barrel within a year, an increase of almost 300 to 400 percent. Inflation surged across the world, economies entered recession, and the global financial system faced one of its biggest post-war crises.

At the time, India depended heavily on imports from the Middle East and had cultivated strong political relations with the Arab world. New Delhi had consistently supported the Palestinian cause and enjoyed considerable goodwill among Arab nations.

There was a belief in India's strategic establishment that this political support would translate into economic benefits and perhaps even preferential pricing of oil.

It did not.

The Arab nations did what nations invariably do.

They protected their own interests.

There was no special discount for India.

There was no reward for decades of diplomatic solidarity.

There was no preferential treatment for a friendly country.

Instead, India paid the same sharply increased prices as everyone else.

India's oil import bill increased from approximately US$414 million in 1973 to nearly US$1.35 billion in 1974, placing enormous pressure on the economy and worsening inflation and balance-of-payments challenges.

The first lesson of international relations was brutally taught to India in 1973: Nations do not sell oil at discounted prices because they like you. They sell it at prices that maximize their interests.

The famous observation of British statesman Lord Palmerston became India's painful reality:

"Nations have no permanent friends or permanent enemies.
They have only permanent interests."

The Arab nations followed this principle perfectly.

India learned it the hard way.

What Would Kautilya Have Advised?

More than two thousand years before modern geopolitics was born, Kautilya had already understood the nature of statecraft.

The central philosophy of the Arthashastra is neither idealism nor sentimentality.

It is national interest.

Kautilya argued that the prosperity and security of the state must always take precedence over emotional or ideological considerations.

A ruler's foremost duty is to protect the economic foundations of the state because economic strength determines political power.

If Kautilya were advising India in 1973, he may have asked a simple question: Why should a nation trust its energy security to the goodwill of others?

He would probably have advised India to diversify suppliers, create strategic reserves, and prepare for disruptions rather than hope for concessions.

In many ways, the energy policies pursued by modern India are remarkably Kautilyan in spirit.

The Modi Doctrine: Strategic Neutrality & the Primacy of National Interest

Fast forward to 2025-26.

The conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States once again raised fears of a major disruption in global energy supplies.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly one-fifth of the world's petroleum consumption passes, faced serious threats.

For India, the risks were enormous.

Today, India imports more than 85 percent of its crude oil requirements. Any prolonged disruption in West Asia could potentially trigger inflation, weaken the rupee, and slow economic growth.

Yet India's response was fundamentally different from that of 1973.

India did not choose sides.

India did not publicly align itself with Iran.

India did not abandon Israel.

Instead, New Delhi consistently called for restraint, dialogue, and de-escalation while quietly focusing on one overriding objective: Ensuring India's energy security.

The government diversified crude imports, strengthened relationships with multiple suppliers, expanded strategic petroleum reserves, and ensured that adequate oil stocks were available.

When concerns emerged regarding possible disruptions through the Strait of Hormuz, India increased imports from alternative suppliers in Africa and Latin America and maintained sufficient supplies.

This was not ideology.

This was strategic planning.

This was statecraft.

This was, in the truest sense, an "India First" approach.

Two Wars, Two Philosophies

The differences between the two eras are striking.

 
The comparison reveals a profound transformation in India's strategic thinking.

Indira Gandhi sought security through relationships.

Narendra Modi sought security through preparedness.

Indira Gandhi expected economic benefits from political solidarity.

Narendra Modi assumed that every country would ultimately prioritize its own interests and therefore prepared accordingly.

One trusted goodwill.

The other built resilience.

The Rise of India's ‘Multi-Alignment Doctrine’

For decades after independence, India's foreign policy was influenced by moral considerations, anti-colonial solidarity, and ideological commitments.

Today's India operates differently.

It maintains strategic partnerships with Israel while preserving cordial relations with Iran.

It buys oil from Russia while strengthening ties with the United States.

It deepens engagement with Saudi Arabia and the UAE while participating in forums that include countries with competing interests.

This is not inconsistency.

This is strategic multi-alignment.

The question is no longer: Who is India's friend?

The question now is: What serves India's interests?

This represents one of the most significant transformations in Indian diplomacy since independence.

India no longer seeks permanent alliances.

It seeks permanent interests.

Energy Security Is National Security

Oil is not merely an economic commodity.

It is the lifeblood of modern civilization.

No economy can function without energy.

No military can operate without fuel.

No transportation system can survive without petroleum.

Strategic petroleum reserves are therefore not storage facilities.

They are instruments of national security.

They are insurance policies against geopolitical uncertainty.

A family that saves money for emergencies can survive a crisis.

A nation that stores energy for emergencies can survive wars it did not start.

The real lesson of the recent West Asian crisis is not that India remained neutral.

The real lesson is that India remained prepared.

Final Thoughts: The Price of Oil & the Price of Illusions

Can nations depend on sentiment in international relations?

Can political friendship substitute economic preparedness?

Can goodwill fill oil tankers?

Or does history repeatedly teach us that nations survive not by the kindness of others but by the wisdom of their own preparation?

The 1973 oil crisis taught India an expensive lesson.

Political solidarity does not guarantee economic security.

The recent Iran-Israel-US conflict demonstrated another lesson.

Strategic neutrality, diversification, and preparedness offer far greater protection than expectations of preferential treatment.

One government hoped for cheaper oil.

The other ensured there would be oil.

And in the unforgiving world of geopolitics, that difference means everything.

Perhaps the entire story can be summarized in a single sentence: In geopolitics, sympathy does not fill oil tanks. Strategy does.

Or, as Kautilya might have put it: The first duty of a state is ‘not to be loved.’ It is to ‘survive, prosper, and protect its people.’

That, ultimately, is the ‘essence’ of an ‘India-First foreign policy.’